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ABSTRACT 
In the 1980s, Senegalese ethnic harmony was tarnished by the emergence of the 
Mouvement des Forces Démocratiques de la Casamance (MFDC). The major demand of 
this organization was the independence of Casamance, a southern province of Senegal. In 
the initial years of the movement (1980-1990), the MFDC capitalized upon the 
grievances of the local populations, and received support from them. In the first half of 
the 1990s, it began to receive substantial support from neighboring countries and in 
response came to rely less upon the support of local constituents. It escalated the violence 
not only against the state but also against local populations, which reinforced its growing 
dependence upon external patrons rather than popular support.  In the 1990s, the 
government of Senegal worked to cut off both external and internal support to the 
MFDC, by improving its relations with the neighboring countries and by practicing a 
politics of “charm” vis à vis the local populations. In response, the MFDC has become 
engaged in the illegal exploitation of the natural resources. As the MFDC has shifted 
from one support base to another, it has pragmatically altered tactics and objectives. This 
demonstrated adaptability of the MFDC has important implications for our understanding 
of post-Cold War civil conflicts, and for the governments’ efforts to resolve them.  It 
suggests that the distinction between "greed" and "grievance," which motivates much of 
the recent scholarly debate on ethnic conflict, is largely a false one, and that governments 
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I. INTRODUCTION  
Scholars have long considered Senegal exceptional among African states. First, 
Senegal is unique in its preservation of a form of multiparty democratic politics since 
independence, in contrast to many other African countries where democracy has faltered. 
Second, the country is singular for its creation of effective state power, having 
established an especially successful institutional network for the assertion of an authentic 
(”empirical”) statehood over most of the national territory.1 Finally, Senegal is 
exceptional because of its ethnic harmony. The country is comprised of approximately 17 
ethnic groups.2 One of the several factors maintaining this harmony is the use of Wolof 
as a lingua franca. As an ethnic group, the Wolof comprises about 40 percent of the 
population.  However, the Wolof language is spoken by the great majority (perhaps 80 
percent) of Senegalese citizens, and it is the dominant spoken language of all the 
country’s large towns. In urban areas, the Wolof have incorporated other identities by 
assimilation, migration or intermarriage.3  
Unfortunately Senegalese excellence was seriously challenged and tarnished in 
the 1980s by the Mouvement des Forces Démocratiques de la Casamance (MFDC). The 
major demand of this organization was the independence of Casamance, a southern 
province of Senegal. According to the MFDC, Casamance was never a part of Senegal 
during the colonial period, since it was administered first by Portugal, then by France 
under a special status conferred on the region. In addition, the MFDC articulates other 
grievances including: 
• appropriation, by local authorities representing the central government, of 
the region’s lands, at the expense of local populations; 
• imposition of laws which do not take into account the customs and 
traditions of the region’s populations; 
                                                 
1 Donal B. Cruise O’Brien, “The Senegalese Exception,” Africa: Journal of the International African 
Studies 66, no. 3 (1996): 458. 
2 Mamadou Diouf, “Between Ethnic Memories and Colonial History in Senegal: The MFDC and the 
Struggle for Independence in Casamance,” in Ethnicity and Democracy, ed. Bruce Berman et al (Oxford: 
James Currey Publishers, 1994). 
3 O’Brien, “The Senegalese Exception,” 460. 
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• victimization of Casamance’s ethnic groups through cultural contempt; 
• disadvantage suffered by the region of Casamance in the area of 
investment;  
• and the absence, for several decades, of natives of Casamance from local 
government in the region. 
Despite the military, social, economic, political, and diplomatic efforts of the 
Senegalese government to address these grievances, the MFDC has been fighting state 
forces since 1982.  What really drives the MFDC insurgency in southern Senegal?  This 
thesis will show that the MFDC insurgency has fundamentally remade itself twice, both 
times in response to successful government initiatives to cut off its support base.  From a 
popular grievance-based insurgency in the 1980s, it transformed itself into a proxy force 
of neighboring countries during the 1990s, and then into a resource-driven movement 
after the turn of the century. As the MFDC has shifted from one support base to another, 
it has pragmatically altered tactics and objectives.  This demonstrated adaptability has 
important implications for our understanding of post-Cold War civil conflicts, and for 
governments' efforts to resolve them.  
The literature on the causes of ethnic conflict and secessionism is vast.  Three sets 
of variables are commonly identified as causes of secession.4 The first comprises 
structural aspects of the country itself, such as geography, age, and the size and 
configuration of its population. Intuitively, the younger a country is, the less likely it is to 
have passed through the growing pains of nation-building and national integration and the 
more vulnerable it is to dismemberment.5 Countries that consist of two or more distinct 
land masses (as was Pakistan before the secession of Bangladesh) provide particularly 




                                                 
4 Pierre Englebert and Rebecca Hummel, “Let’s Stick Together: Understanding Africa’s Secessionist 
Deficit,” African Affairs 104, no. 416 (2005): 403-406. 
5 James D. Fearon and David Laitin, “Ethnicity, Insurgency and Civil War,” American Political 
Science Review  97, no. 1 (February 2003): 84. 
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population is, the greater the potential for break-up. Finally, the more culturally 
heterogeneous a country’s population is, the more likely it is that there will be demands 
for self-determination.6  
The second set of factors deals with the nature and dynamics of the political 
system. While many theorists argue that democratic systems contain separatist tendencies 
better than autocratic, the persistence of separatist movements in Canada, France, India, 
Spain and the United Kingdom suggests that there may be little relationship between the 
level of democracy and secessionism. However, rather than the nature of the regime, the 
extent and intensity of political change may matter a great deal for would-be separatists. 
Political transitions often make states vulnerable and can create climates that foster 
separatist movements. Furthermore, when the central state is weakened, overthrown or 
collapsed, its ability to prevent a secessionist drive is greatly reduced.7  Saideman, for 
example, argues that periods of democratization and economic transition tend to intensify 
ethnic identities and the security dilemmas that ultimately drive secessionism.8   
The third set of factors, highlighted by recent scholarship, involve individual and 
group motives that lead to civil war and secession.  Within this school of thought scholars 
are divided between those who support the ‘grievance’ hypothesis and those who prefer 
the ‘greed’ hypothesis.  The former emphasize the predominance of communal 
‘grievances,’ and thus point to the importance of political and social motives driving civil 
war and secessionism.  Richards thus describes the Sierra Leonean civil war as "a drama 
of social exclusion."9  Le Billon argues more generally that "while significant, it is 
important not to over-emphasize the financial aspects of a conflict and lose sight of 
                                                 
6 Englebert and Hummel, “Let’s Stick Together,” 404. 
7 Ibid. 
8 Stephen M. Saideman, “Is Pandora’s Box Half-Empty or Half-Full? The Limited Virulence of 
Secessionism and the Domestic Sources of Disintegrations,” in The International Spread of Ethnic 
Conflict: Fear, Diffusion and Escalation, ed. David Lake and Donald Rothschild (Princeton, NJ: Princeton 
University Press, 1998). 
9 Paul Richards, Fighting for the Rain Forest: War, Youth and Resources in Sierra Leone (London: 
James Currey, 1996). 
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political and social aspects."10  Sambanis similarly argues that identity wars are due 
predominantly to political grievances rather than lack of economic opportunity.11  
The new literature on ‘greed’ argues that recent rebellions have a far more explicit 
economic agenda than was the case before 1989.  Keen suggests that in the post-Cold 
War period, "war has increasingly become the continuation of economics by other 
means."12  Clapham posits that the weakening of the African state by various forces, 
including structural adjustment programs (SAPs), has made it a less worthwhile target, so 
that in recent conflicts "insurgents found it easier just to capture the trading networks on 
which states had depended, and use them for their own purposes."13 Collier and Hoeffler 
find that opportunity provides considerably more explanatory power than grievance.14 
Thus, the availability of natural resources, mainly oil and other mineral products, appears 
to be an important factor in civil conflicts. However, Michael Ross finds that different 
resources have sharply different effects on the kind of conflict that is likely to arise, 
depending upon whether or not they are “lootable”-- that is, whether it can be easily 
appropriated by individuals or small groups of unskilled workers.  Lootable resources -- 
such as diamonds and drugs -- are more likely to ignite non-separatist conflicts, which 
once begun are harder to resolve; but they pose little danger of igniting separatist 
conflicts. On the other hand, “unlootable” resources -- like oil, natural gas, and deep-shaft 
minerals -- tend to produce separatist conflicts, while seldom influencing non-separatist 
conflicts.15  
This work is motivated largely by debates about which of the proposed causal 
factors best explains ethnic conflict and secessionism.  Much less attention has been 
                                                 
10 Philippe Le Billon, et al, “The Political Economy of War: What Relief Agencies Need to Know,” 
Humanitarian Practice Network Paper No. 33, (2000): 36. 
11 Nicolas Sambanis, “Do Ethnic and Nonethnic Civil Wars Have the Same Causes? A Theoretical 
Inquiry (Part 1),” The Journal of Conflict Resolution 45, no. 3 (June 2001): 259. 
12 David Keen, “The Economic Functions of Violence in Civil Wars,” Adelphi Paper no. 320 (1998): 
11. 
13 Christopher Clapham, “Introduction: Analyzing African Insurgencies,” in African Guerillas, ed. 
Christopher Clapham (Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press, 1998). 
14 Paul Collier and Anke Hoeffler, “Greed and Grievance in Civil War,” Center for the Study of 
African Economics Working Paper. World Bank, 2001. 
15 Michael L. Ross,  Natural Resources and Civil War: An Overview, (Los Angeles: University of 
California, Los Angeles, Department of Political Science, 2003). 
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given to considering the interaction of these factors and the extent to which the 
motivations of rebellions and secessionist movements may shift from grievance to greed 
over time.  My research will build upon Duffield's analysis of how rebel strategies reflect 
shifting internal and external relations, arguing that the foundation of Casamance 
rebellion in Senegal has changed fundamentally over time, from grievance, to 
opportunity, to greed, in response to shifting balances of available resources (specifically, 
local support, regional arms/support, and international markets).16  
MFDC leaders are now driven by resource logic, but it has not always been so.  In 
the initial years of the movement (1982-1990), the MFDC capitalized upon the 
grievances of the local populations, and received support from them. It used low-level 
violence against the state in the name of these populations.  In the 1990s, it began to 
receive substantial support and benefits from neighboring countries and in response came 
to rely less upon the support of local constituents.  With the change in the source of its 
support, the MFDC demonstrated an increased inclination to use violence not only 
against the state but also against local populations, which reinforced its growing 
dependence upon external patrons rather than popular support.    
In the early 2000s, the government of Senegal worked to cut off both external and 
internal support to the MFDC, by improving its relations with the neighboring countries 
and practicing a politics of ‘charm’ vis à vis the local populations, while buying off 
MFDC leaders (i.e., paying them not to fight). The rebellion lost its remaining popular 
support and the support of external actors as a result of these government initiatives. 
Weakened, the leadership signed a ceasefire agreement with the Government in which 
the word “independence” was not mentioned.  In exchange, the movement received 
financing for economic projects from the state and from some internationally-based 
Senegalese partners.  Unfortunately for the peace process, the MFDC subsequently 
moved beyond these initial legal initiatives to become increasingly engaged in the illegal 
exploitation of natural resources. The movement has not disarmed or demobilized.  Some 
minor skirmishes occur from time to time.  In other words, a situation of “neither peace 
nor war” prevails in Casamance, as the MFDC has become increasingly driven by greed. 
                                                 
16 Mark Duffield, “Post-Modern Conflict: Warlords, Post-Adjustment States and Private Protection,” 
Civil Wars 1, no. 1 (1998): 84. 
6 
In the following chapters, I undertake a comparative analysis of the MFDC 
insurgency in three different time periods, showing how the nature of the rebellion varies 
with the nature of its primary resource base across the three periods. Chapter two presents 
the MFDC as popular secessionist movement from 1982 to 1990; chapter three 
demonstrates the shift to externally supported and more generalized violence from 1990 
to 2000; and chapter four shows the shift to profit driven insecurity from 2000 to the 
present.  I hope to demonstrate how the nature of resources available to the movement 
(my independent variable) restructured elites' cost-benefit analyses (my intervening 
variable), and thereby led to the transformation of the motivation of the rebellion (my 
dependent variable) from grievance, to opportunity, to greed. 
7 
II. FROM PEACE TO POPULAR SECESSIONIST MOVEMENT 
(1981 – 1990) 
This chapter will explain the first strategy of the MFDC in the 1980s when the 
movement operated as a popular secessionist insurgency by capitalizing, in its own 
interests, upon the resentment of the population. I begin with a background sketch of the 
situation in Senegal and in Casamance region.  I then review the different grievances of 
the local populations, and show that these grievances engendered an ethnic consciousness 
that united the population in the region.  Finally, I argue that this minority consciousness 
was articulated and exploited by the local elites who sought to mobilize local popular 
support in opposition to the state, with the ultimate goal of (re)gaining positions in the 
state apparatus for themselves.  
 
A. SENEGAL AND CASAMANCE REGION 
1. Senegal 
The Republic of Senegal is located in the western part of the African continent 
between Mauritania to the north, Mali to the east, Guinea Conakry and Guinea Bissau to 
the south and the Atlantic Ocean to the west. The Republic of Gambia is an enclave 
stretching into the southern part of the Senegalese territory, separating the Casamance 
from the rest of Senegal. 
Senegal is divided into ten administrative regions: Saint Louis, Louga, Diourbel, 
Thies, Dakar, Ziguinchor, Fatick, Kolda, Tambacounda and Kaolack. Its population is 
currently estimated at ten million inhabitants. 
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Figure 1.   Administrative divisions of Senegal (From ECOWAS PART 2 DEF, 
SENEGAL). 
                                       
Two major religions are practiced in Senegal, namely: 
• Islam practiced by 94% of the population; 
• Christianity practiced by 5% of the population; 
• Animism and others practiced by 1% of the population. 
9 
The Senegalese population is comprised of 17 major ethnic groups, which can be 
classified into four larger groups. The first among these, the Sahelian-Sudanese group, is 
the largest numerically, consists of the Wolofs (over 40% of the population) and Sereres 
(about 15% of the population). The Wolofs live in all regions, notably in towns, and are 
the majority in the Northwest and the West, while Sereres are found especially in the 
central regions (Fatick, Kaolack, and Thies). The second group, the Hal pulaar, consists 
of the Peuls and Toucouleurs (about 15% and 10% respectively) and is scattered 
throughout the country with the largest concentration in the Senegal river valley and the 
Ferlo. The third group, the sub-Guinean, (about 13% of the population), consists of the 
Diolas, Balants, Mandiaks, Mankagnes, Bainouks in the Lower Casamance, the Bassaris, 
Bediks, Koniaguis in the Tambacounda region. The final group, the Mande group, is 
numerically the smallest: it consists of the Soninkes, Bambaras, and Malinkes, who live 
in certain areas of Casamance and in Tambacounda region. 
Table 1 shows that the Senegalese freely settle throughout the national territory, 
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Table 1.   Distribution of the Senegalese population per ethnic groups and residential areas. 












Table 2.   Linguistic Distribution of the Population 
 
The six main languages are recognized by the constitution as national languages. 
Percentage of the Population Speaking Selected Languages: 
A language can be spoken not only by its ethnic group but also by other ethnic 
groups. For example, as an ethnic group, the Wolofs as ethnic group represent 43.5 
percent of the population; however, Wolof as language is spoken by about 70 percent of 
the Senegalese population. Below are the percentages of the population speaking a 
selected language, as indicated in the 1988 census: Wolof: 70.9 %; Pulaar: 24.1 %; 
Serere: 13.7 %; Joola: 05.7%; Manding: 06.2 %; Sarakole-Soninke: 01.4 %. 
 
2. Casamance 
Casamance is the most southern region of Senegal. Due to its specific 
characteristics, Casamance contrasts with the rest of Senegal. Unlike the northern part of 
Senegal, this region belongs to the tropical humid zone, receiving more rain than the rest 
of Senegal. The rainy season, which is longer in Casamance region than in the rest of 
Senegal, extends from June until October. This region can receive up to three to four 
times more precipitation than the north of Senegal. This fact explains why the area is so 
green and fertile. Casamance region also enjoys dense forests and is shaped by a network 
of very tight backwaters. 
12 
Since 1984, Casamance has been divided into two administrative regions: 
Ziguinchor and Kolda. The region of Kolda has three departments: Kolda, Sedhiou and 
Velingara. It represents the Upper and Middle Casamance. It covers 21,011 sq km and 
has a population of 577,385 inhabitants. The upper Casamance is the country of the Peul 
whereas the Middle Casamance is mainly the land of the Mandingo, but it is also possible 
to find Joola, Balant or Peul in this area. 
 








 Kolda Sedhiou Velingara Overall 
 Pop. % Pop. % Pop. % Pop. % 
Balant 1,950 1.1 36,960 13.4 120 0.1 39,260 6.8 
Joola 2,840 1.6 30,060 10.9 870 0.7 34,070 5.9 
Mandingo 17,210 9.7 108,940 39.5 10,310 8.3 136,260 23.6 
Manjaak 710 0.4 22,890 8.3 120 0.1 23,670 4.1 
Peul/Pulaar 130,410 73.5 54,880 19.9 99,320 80.0 284,650 49.3 
Wolof 13,480 7.6 4,410 1.6 1,490 1.2 19,630 3.4 
Sarakole 4,260 2.4 1,930 0.7 5,460 4.4 11,550 2.0 
Mancagne 710 0.4 4,410 1.6 250 0.2 5,200 0.9 
Others 5,860 3.3 11,310 4.1 60,080 4.9 23,100 4.0 
Total 177, 432 100 275,797 100 124,156 100 577,385 100 
Table 3.   Distribution of the resident Senegalese population in the Kolda region by ethnic 
group (Source: 1988 Census). 
 
The region of Ziguinchor has three departments: Ziguinchor, Bignona and 
Oussouye. According to the 1988 census, Ziguinchor, also known as Lower Casamance, 
covers an area of 7,339 sq km. The population of 390,252 is mostly Joola, though there 
are also Bainuk, Mandinka, Manjak and Mankagn. The Joola however, are the most 
important element in the region of Ziguinchor, with over 60 percent of the resident 
Senegalese population.  
The ethnic composition of each of the three departments in the Ziguinchor region 





 Bignona Oussouye Ziguinchor Overall 
 Pop. % Pop. % Pop. % Pop. % 
Joola 147,630 80,6 30,420 82.4 58,680 34,5 236,740 60.7 
Mandingo 11,200 6.1 560 1.5 24,590 14.4 36,350 9.3 
Pulaar 9,530 5.2 1,750 4.7 23,020 13.5 34,300 8.8 
Wolof 3,260 1.8 1,750 4.8 13,740 8.2 18,750 4.8 
Manjaak 1,580 0.9 260 0.7 12,840 7.5 14,670 3.8 
Mancagne 380 0.2 120 0.3 9,540 5.6 10, 040 2.6 
Balant 1,550 0.8 110 0.3 8,150 4.8 9,810 2.5 




1.1 460 1.2 5,430 3.2 7,980 2.0  
Others 3,670 2.0 210 0.6 8,360 4.9 12,240 3.1 
Total 183,117 100 36,925 100 170,210 100 390,252 100 
Table 4.   Ethnic Composition of the three Departments of Ziguinchor 
 
Tables 3 and 4 show that despite the ethnic diversity of the Casamance region, 
one ethnic group is dominant in each of the sub-regions: the Joola in the three districts 
constituting the Ziguinchor region (Lower Casamance) while being a minority in the 
districts of Kolda, and the Peul being the majority in the district of Velingara and the 
















51.2 3.3 17.6 32.0 
Layene 
brotherhood 
0.4 0.1 0.2 0.3 
Mouride 
brotherhood 
3.3 2.5 5.0 4.0 
Tidiane 
brotherhood 
17.0 14.6 31.2 22.9 
Other Muslims 18.1 6.0 16.0 16.0 
Catholics 7.9 26.1 23.8 16.6 
Other Christians 0.3 1.6 0.4 0.5 
Other Religions 1.8 45.8 5.8 7.7 
Total  100 100 100 100 
Table 5.   Distribution of the Senegalese population by department according to religion and 
brotherhood in the region of Ziguinchor (%). Source: Recensement Général de la 
Population et de l’Habitat de 1988. 
 
Table 5 shows that Muslims and Christians represent a majority in the department 
of Bignona (90% Muslims, 8.2% Christians) and Ziguinchor (70% Muslims, 24.2% 
Christians), whereas in Oussouye there is a higher proportion of the population who are 
from other local religions (45.8%). 
 
B. THE ORIGINS OF JOOLA GRIEVANCES 
The first dissatisfaction of the Joola ethnic group appeared with the imposition of 
a French colonial administration in the Lower Casamance. The French, like other colonial 
powers in West Africa, generally tried to impose a system of indirect rule through local 
16 
intermediaries. Outside Casamance, in much of the rest of Senegal, hierarchical, strongly 
Islamized societies, after some resistance, proved highly co-optable by French 
colonialism. But in Casamance, the French faced two problems. First, the fragmented, 
anarchical nature of societies there meant that clear and co-optable local power structures 
were lacking. French attempts to install chiefs, therefore, often Wolof or Mandingo, 
failed: the Joola communities refused to recognize their authority and the "chiefs" abused 
their positions. Second, Islam - such a powerful ally in the north - came to Casamance 
relatively late, around the turn of the 19th to 20th century.17   
The idea of establishing non-natives as chiefs within Joola groups was perceived 
by the Joola as an attack on their liberty and as such could neither be accepted nor 
respected. When the French realized that their appointed chiefs had no authority and that 
the Joola were obeying the orders of chiefs unknown to the French administration, they 
decided to undertake an energetic repression against the Joola.18 In 1906, in a letter to the 
General Governor of French West Africa (Afrique Occidentale Francaise - AOF), the 
Governor of the Colonies of Senegal confided that “...it is advisable to adapt from now on 
a real programme of pacification and progressive penetration for the Casamance.”19 
Moreover, in 1917, the governor-general of the AOF, Van Vollenhoven, admitted that 
“we are not the masters of the Lower Casamance. We are only tolerated there.”20 
Furthermore, the relationship between the French and Joola worsened during the two 
Great Wars (World War I and II). Indeed, during WW I and II the recruitment of Joola 
Forces, as well as the payment of taxes towards the wars, encountered strong opposition. 
Products such as rice were requisitioned by the French administration. This requisition 
was very badly accepted by the Joola for whom rice represented their way of life and was 
at the heart of their culture.21 
                                                 
17 Martin Evans, The Casamance Conflict, 1982-1999 (London: African Research Group, Foreign and 
Commonwealth Office, 1999).  
18 Christian Roche, Histoire de la Casamance. Conquête et Résistance: 1850-1920 (Paris: Karthala, 
1985). 
19 CAOM, 13 G 380, Casamance Affaires Politiques diverses. 1904-1909. 
20 Evans, The Casamance Conflict. 
21 E.P.R. Nicole, “A Separatist Issue in Post-Colonial Africa: The Case of the Casamance (Senegal)” 
(Thesis, University of Birmingham, 1997), 80. 
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The Joola were also hostile to the post-colonial state, since the modern Senegalese 
state has maintained the colonial power structure of bureaucratic authoritarianism and 
clientelism. The main feature of the administration was its high degree of centralization, 
the outstanding legacy of the Jacobin background of metropolitan France. The Senegalese 
equivalents of metropolitan circles, subdivisions and cantons were regions, prefectures, 
sub-prefectures and districts. These territorial structures were supposed to bring rulers 
closer to their subjects, and to facilitate the participation of the people in development 
activities.22 As Brown puts it, all developing states have experienced political tensions 
between attempts by central governments to expand their influence and attempts by 
peripheral communities to defend their autonomy.23   
Following independence, the Senegalese government undertook a number of 
unwelcome new policies that further alienated the Joola. Among them were the 1964 
National Domains Act completed by the 1972 reform of the territorial administration, and 
the Family Code of 1972. The 1964 National Domains Act established the State’s 
proprietary rights over all land for which no legal deed existed. By withdrawing 
recognition of “customary” communal land tenure rights, the reform aimed to do away 
with ethnic homelands.  
This law violated Joola traditions and customs. As a result of this law, the Joola 
would no longer be able to distribute their land in the way they had done traditionally. 
Hence, when Dakar failed to take into consideration the local traditions, government 
decisions were either not applied by the people of Casamance or were circumvented by 
them. Moreover, due to the new law there was - through the rural council created in 1972 
- an increase in the demand on land in Casamance by people coming not only from 
Casamance but also the rest of Senegal.24  
However, the 1964 law on national land states that to be awarded land, one must 
reside in the communauté rurale (rural community). Nicole suggests that rural councils 
prefer to award some land to those who are financially sound and as a result tend to come 
                                                 
22 Diouf, “Between Ethnic Memories and Colonial History in Senegal,” 237. 
23 David Brown, The State and Ethnic Politics in Southeast Asia (New York: Routledge, 1996). 
24  Nicole, “A Separatist Issue in Post-Colonial Africa: The Case of the Casamance (Senegal),”  124. 
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from the city rather than to the local villagers, who tend to be less financially secure.25 
Therefore, this law led to a new wave of immigration from the north of Senegal (people 
fleeing drought) towards Casamance, and to an increase in expropriations in order to 
establish tourist facilities such as Club Mediterranée in Cap Skirring. The redistribution 
of urban and rural spaces increased misunderstandings between the people of Casamance 
and the immigrants from the north.26 
Many examples of injustice toward the Joola can be cited. In 1975, the Cabrousse 
villagers were expropriated of their paddy fields to allow Club Mediterranée to extend its 
domain. Meanwhile, the northerners working in the hotel were allowed to build huts 
nearby. The local populations protested in vain. The authorities responded by taking 
repressive measures against the protesters, arresting more than twenty of them.27 It seems 
also that the luxurious hotel “Nema Kadior” was constructed on a cemetery, despite the 
opposition of the indigenous population.  
In some instances, the exploitation of land rights was so extreme that it caused 
individuals to turn to the MFDC. For example, in Kaolack city (in central Senegal), a 
young Joola professor saw his land request rejected, and when he tried to find out the 
reason, he was told to return to the Casamance if he was not satisfied (“Si tu n’es pas 
content, retourne chez toi”). He was later posted to Ziguinchor, where he built a house in 
Nema Kdior on a plot of land offered by his father. He was then expropriated without 
compensation in favor of the owners of hotel “Nema Kadior.” He then joined the 
MFDC.28 Other MFDC leaders, including Diamacoune Senghor, general secretary of the 
movement, were also victims of land expropriation.29  
The Senegalese government was conscious of this phenomenon. A land 
distribution commission was created on October 23, 1990, to increase equity and  
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26 Ibid. 
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transparency. It affected 670 parcels.30 However, the commission worked only on illegal 
expropriation cases. Although this structure still exists on the paper, it is no longer 
operational. 
The land reform was supplemented by a new social code, the Family Code. 
Passed in 1972 by the National Assembly, the Code was designed to boost State 
influence at the expense of local dignitaries by giving many of the powers so far retained 
by the latter to the former. For instance, the celebrations of marriage, the delivery of 
certificate of marriage, or the certificate of heritage, are only under state jurisdiction.  
However, the government tolerated the unilateral decision of the caliph of the Mouride 
brotherhood to ‘suspend’ the application of the Code in his religious centre. Yet when the 
Joola tried to refuse to implement this 1972 Family Code, they were forced to apply it. 
This perceived double standard frustrated the Joola, who refused to apply the Family 
Code in the Casamance region.31   
Political centralization in post-colonial Senegal has been an additional source of 
resentment among the Joola in Casamance. In effect, during most of the colonial period, 
political debates in Senegal were only possible in the Four Communes of Gorée, Saint 
Louis, Rufisque and Dakar. The “originaires” of the Four Communes were French 
citizens, wile people living elsewhere in the colony, such as in Casamance, were subjects, 
without any avenue for expressing their opinions.32 In 1946, citizenship rights were 
extended to the entire Senegalese population. Elites in Casamance used the opening to 
demonstrate their discontent by creating the M.F.D.C. (Mouvement des Forces 
Démocratiques de la Casamance) in 1947.  
This movement is now known as the “historical” MFDC to distinguish it from the 
modern-day MFDC. The historical MFDC wanted Casamance to be able to exercise its 
own political responsibilities, by electing local representatives, instead of having them 
imposed from the outside. According to Cayla, this first movement “… had no separatist 
pretension.... The first movement was gathering all the ethnic groups of Casamance in an 
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effort to affirm the identity of Casamance within the Senegalese entity, and to obtain a 
financial, administrative and territorial autonomy.”33 Nevertheless, the current MFDC, 
formed in the early 1980s, argues that the historical MFDC and the modern-day MFDC 
have always had the same aspiration for Casamance, which is independence. This 
“historical” MFDC joined the Senegalese dominant party, the Bloc Démocratique 
Sénégalais (BDS) in 1954 and became one of its regional branches. Its leadership 
believed that this move would give Casamance more political and economic 
opportunities and help develop the resources of the region.  
In 1954 and 1958, the political life of Casamance was enriched by the creation of 
the MAC (Mouvement Autonomiste de la Casamance) and PRA-Senegal (Parti du 
Regroupement Africain-Senegal). These parties would also integrate into the party of 
former president Senghor in the early 1960s. Although the policy of dialogue and 
assimilation of political parties undertaken by former President Senghor in 1950s and 
1960s seemed to have been successful in most parts of Senegal, it was less so in 
Casamance. Indeed, Dakar had difficulties in co-opting an anarchical society into its 
elite-fusion system of rule.34 As Boone suggests, “the Senegalese government was unable 
to apply its fusion-of-elites policy in Casamance, despite its successes in the Wolof 
groundnut basin, because here, the Dakar regime found no rural leaders with whom to 
broker a stable and secure political alliance; there are no castes, no monarchies or 
aristocracies, and no hierarchal or bureaucratic state structures.” Consequently, 
Senegalese officials appointed non-Joola individuals in the local administration. In 
addition, the few Joola cadres working at the national level lacked local roots. This 
brought MFDC leader Diamacoune Senghor to refute the legitimacy of these so-called 
representatives of Casamance people.35  
A closer look at the “historical” MFDC leadership shows that it also had 
relatively tenuous links with Casamance region. The “historical” MFDC was created in 
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Sedhiou (Casamance), by Emile Badiane, Ibou Diallo, and Victor Diatta. Faye argues that 
it is impossible to consider Emile Badiane and Ibou Diallo as leaders rooted in their land 
because their names do not typically come from Casamance.36 Boone notes that the 
founders of the “historical” MFDC set up the party with “121 literate notables in search 
for their region disenclavement, or integration into Senegal.”37 It is also interesting to 
point out that the M.A.C. (Mouvement Autonomiste de la Casamance) leaders Djibril Sarr 
and Assane Seck were Casamançais who emigrated from northern Senegal.38 Thus, 
Casamance remained underrepresented or ill-represented in the post colonial state 
apparatus.    
The modern-day MFDC considers the integration of political parties from 
Casamance into Senegalese political structures accepted by their predecessors as the first 
big mistake of the movement and condemns this decision, because Senegal and its leaders 
were not faithful to the promises they made to the “historical” MFDC over the 
development of Casamance. Casamance had no other basis for organizing regional 
grievances, since the Senegalese constitution forbids the association of any political party 
with a region, an ethnic group, a race, a sex or a language.  
Another concern for the Joolas during the 1980s was the “Wolofization” of 
Senegalese society, which accompanied increasing administrative centralization. 
Although the Senegalese constitution recognizes six national languages listed 
intentionally in alphabetical order (Diola, Malinke, Pular, Serere, Soninke, and Wolof), 
Wolof is referred to by most people as the national language. The figures from the 1988 
census show that more than eighty percent of the Senegalese population speaks Wolof, 
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twenty-five percent of the population is literate in French. For these reasons, some 
scholars conclude that Senegal may more accurately be considered as a Wolofphone than 
a francophone country.39  
Wolofization, or the spread of Wolof as a lingua franca, can be explained by 
recent Senegalese history. The steady expansion of Wolof began during the colonial 
period. The first contacts between colonial Europe and Senegal took place in Dakar and 
Saint Louis, areas of Wolof speakers. These people were used as interpreters and 
merchants in the trade of gum Arabic. The spread of Wolof continued also thanks to the 
migration of rural populations from the countryside into the cities.  Furthermore, 
Wolofization can be explained by the social and economic influence of the Mouride 
brotherhood, whose origins are in the Wolof heartland, and who exploited new lands in 
areas traditionally occupied by animist Serers (e.g., Baol, Sine Saloum) for the cultivation 
and commercialization of groundnut production. This has favored the spread of the 
Wolof language, since the Sereres who converted to Islam adopted the language of their 
new religious guide.40  
The MFDC blames Wolofization for the fact that the Joola language is being used 
less. The attachment of the Joola to their language is reflected in the fact that more Joola 
speak their own language as a first language than any other group in Senegal (97.4% -- 
see Table 6).  However, the non-Joola in Casamance generally prefer Wolof and 
Mandinka as second languages over Joola (see Table 7).  Moreover, most Joola consider 
Wolofization a second form of colonization. For the Wolof speakers consider themselves 
superior to the Joola speakers.41  
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Balant Joola Mandingo Mancagne Manjaak Pulaar Serere Wolof 
Balant 76.5 0.0 0.0  0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Joola 1.8 97.4 2.5 0.7 2.2 3.6 10.3 3.1 
Mandingo 16.4 1.2 93.8 0.2 0.6 5.5 6.8 2.5 
Mancagne 0.1 0.0 0.1 96.9 0.2 0.0 0.2 0.0 
Manjaak 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.1 91.7 0.0 0.1 0.0 
Pulaarl 0.1 0.0 0.3 0.0 0.0 80.4 0.4 0.3 
Serere 0.0 0.0  0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 45.8 0.0 
Wolof 3.5 1.0 2.9 1.1 2.0 9.9 35.6 93.3 
Other 1.5 0.4 0.4 0.9 3.2 0.5 0.9 0.6 
Total 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 
Number 9,809 236,738 36,351 10,035 14,674 34,303 9,362 18,751 
Table 6.   Distribution of the Senegalese population according to the first spoken language 









Balant Joola Mandi Manc Manj Pulaar Serere Wolof Others 
Balant 3.3 0.0 0.5 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.1 
Joola 4.6 1.1 14.2 2.4 10.5 11.3 9.3 9.1 16.8 
Mandi 39.9 13.3 2.5 3.2 9.8 13.5 8.8 13.1 16.5 
Manj 0.3 0.1 0.1 0.3 0.9 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.1 
Pulaar 0.5 0.3 1.8 0.1 0.1 3.7 0.7 2.4 1.6 
Serere 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.1 3.6 0.5 0.0 
Wolof 17.9 28.0 32.9 34.3 26.7 37.5 37.5 5.1 26.2 
Other 33.2 57.1 48.1 59.0 51.6 33.8 39.9 69.8 38.6 
Total 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 
Number 9,809 236,738 36,351 10,035 14,674 34,304 9,362 18,751 20,228 
Table 7.   Distribution of the Senegalese population according to the second spoken 
language and the ethnic group of origin in the region of Ziguinchor (%) Source: 
1988 census 
 
Wolofization is also evident in education policies. A student has to leave his local 
home area to advance his education because the universities are situated in Dakar and 
Saint Louis. By moving to these northern towns for his higher education, a Joola student 
becomes part of Wolof culture, and in order not to stand out or to be treated as rustic, he 
tends to modify his dress, speech, and living pattern so that he fits in. 
The MFDC also deplores the disadvantage suffered by Casamance region in the 
area of investment, especially in the farming sector, despite the region’s huge potential. 
25 
Like many developing countries, Senegal is characterized by a strong concentration of its 
economic activities near the capital. In 1975 for instance, income per capita was as 
follows: Cap Vert (current Dakar region): 253,000 Francs CFA; Thies: 80,400 Francs 
CFA; Fleuve (current Saint Louis and Louga regions): 55,000 Francs CFA; Senegal 
Oriental (current Tambacounda region): 49,200 Francs CFA; Casamance (current 
Ziguinchor and Kolda regions): 48,000 Francs CFA; Diourbel: 41,200 Francs CFA. 
These data show that at the time that the movement was forming, Casamance was at the 
bottom of the pyramid.42 Moreover, what might be the granary of Senegal has in fact 
never played this role because its numerous natural resources are not properly exploited.   
Diouf argues that in the 1960s and 1970s the region of Casamance, under the national 
development plans and public investment programs, benefited from significant 
investments aimed at ending the major constraints facing the region. However, most of 
the economic projects failed in the 1980s.43 As Nicol writes, “whereas the economic 
development of Casamance took an important place in the first plan in 1961, no follow-
up was given to these projects and many workers from Casamance had to migrate to the 
north of Senegal or to Europe to find employment.”44At the industrial level, Ziguinchor 
has only two production units: La SEIC and Amerger.45 The former existed since the 
colonial period. It produces electricity and transforms groundnut oil. The latter, more 
recent, processes shrimp.  Casamance is not the poorest region of the country, and Evans 
finds little evidence that the Casamance region has been the most “abandoned” among 
the provinces of Senegal.46 Nevertheless, the relative underdevelopment of Casamance 
region, in the context of its other grievances, contributed to the feelings of discrimination, 
negligence, and relative deprivation. The Joola have the perception that they do not 
deserve this “unjust” abandonment. 
Finally, having the country of Gambia between Casamance and the rest of 
Senegal has reinforced the isolation of Casamance. Until World War II, poor transport 
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links had left Casamance relatively isolated from the north of Senegal. There was and 
still is no railroad in Casamance. Until the transgambienne highway, which links Dakar 
and Casamance was completed in 1957, the only”rapid” connection between the two 
areas had been by sea.47 It is therefore not surprising to hear Joola people traveling to 
Dakar say “I am going to Senegal” as if Casamance were not a part of Senegal.  
 
C. THE EMERGENCE OF ETHNIC CONSCIOUSNESS 
All the grievances identified contributed to the development of a single Joola 
consciousness, despite the fact that there had never been a united Joola kingdom, but 
rather a multiplicity of sub-groups with both commonalities and divisions. Indeed as 
Evans writes, 
the Joola are certainly a diverse grouping: their language group comprises 
some 14 dialects, not all mutually intelligible. The contrasts and, in some 
cases, tensions between Joola groups are evident, notably between the 
Fogny (predominantly Muslims) and the Kasa (mainly Catholic or 
animist).  In fact, what one calls the Joola ethnic group appears to be 
largely a modern invention.48  
The consolidation of a Joola ethnic group is a response to the assimilationist and 
centralizing character of state penetration. It is indeed the perception of the 
assimilationist implications of state penetration that has provided a locus, at the level of 
consciousness, for the Joola rebellion. To quote Silverstein, we can say about the Joola 
that “what moved them were their common fears of Wolofization, loss of cultural 
identity, interferences in their affairs by the national government and a belief that the 
Wolofs were creating an internal colonial system in which they would not share the 
wealth of the country, the growth of the economy and the right of self-determination.”49  
Indeed, the process of incorporation into and penetration by the Senegalese state 
is clearly a major situational change for Casamance populations, and it has produced 
correspondingly major changes in their communal identities. The Joola have come to see 
the state as the dominant influence upon them, and to identify themselves in relation to 
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this dominant other. They were labeled as subordinate groups having the marginal status 
of “second-class citizens,” were designated as a minority in someone else’s homeland 
rather than inhabitants of their own, and were subject to policies which led to the 
deprivation of their region and community. They began, therefore, to modify their sense 
of identity, and to develop an awareness of their relative deprivation within the state. This 
became the basis for an incipient sense of ethnic identity.  Ironically, the Senegalese state 
policies of centralization and assimilation have engendered a sense of minority 
consciousness in which the recognition of disunity itself provided a basis for ethnic unity.  
Why did the consolidation of this new Joola consciousness, hardly unique in 
postcolonial Africa, result in a separatist rebellion? To answer this question, we need to 
explain how minority consciousness at the mass level became linked to, and mobilized 
by, political elites.  
 
D. ARTICULATION AND EXPLOITATION OF THE GRIEVANCES BY 
THE MFDC 
Whether minority consciousness leads toward political acquiescence or rebellion 
depends on whether, and how, it is ideologized by political elites. Brown posits that “in 
the absence of any such mobilizing elite within the community, the inchoate minority 
consciousness at mass level would not be ideologized, and would thus fail to develop into 
politically salient ethno nationalism.”50 In August 1980, while the government was in 
recess, Augustin Diamacoune Senghor, a Catholic priest from Casamance, gave a lecture 
on the Joola resistance to colonization at the Dakar Chamber of Commerce.  This marked 
the beginning of Joola elites' creation and propagation of a Joola pan-ethnic nationalism 
by referring to history, geography and Joola culture.  
In November 1981, a group of Joola leaders including Diamacoune held a secret 
meeting in the sacred forest near the Ziguinchor airport where they decided to revive the 
MFDC. In 1982, shortly before Christmas, approximately 1000 people marched from the 
sacred forest to several government buildings where they replaced the Senegalese flag 
with a white flag. Carrying signs that said “Free Casamance,” the demonstrators 
                                                 
50 Brown, The State and Ethnic Politics in Southeast Asia, 54. 
28 
demanded independence. The government responded violently with mass arrests 
including the organizers of the demonstration.  
To cope with a dire economic situation, in 1979 Senegal had sought economic 
help from the International Monetary Fund (IMF). Conditionalities attached to IMF 
assistance required drastic austerity policies, which affected hiring in the civil service, 
public corporations and parastatals. Foucher finds that  
having recruited an average of 3,000 people per year in the 1960s and 
1970s, the civil service only managed to recruit the same number over the 
whole period of 1981-1990. This hit Casamance particularly hard, since 
the niche they [Casamançais] had established for themselves, through a 
particular educational trajectory, was in the lower echelons of public 
service: the little recruitment now occurring was instead usually the result 
of natural wastage, and hence to more senior posts.51  
Thus, many Joola state employees lost their jobs during the 1980s. 
Foucher notes that trade historically had been a ‘blocked road’ for the Joola 
because it was largely outsiders who formed the backbone of local commercial networks 
(Wolof, Peul, Mandingo and Europeans traders). He concludes that the only option for 
economic advancement for the Joola was public employment. After the Second World 
War, growing urban job opportunities (through the “Africanization” of the colonial 
administration, suppression of salary inequalities between French and Africans, and 
increased French investment) began to draw large numbers of young Joola to Dakar.  
After independence, the growth of the public sector was significant: between 1960 and 
1981 the Senegalese administration increased from 6,000 to 67,000 employees.52 It is 
difficult to establish precisely how many Joola worked in this administration because 
Senegal does not publish data based on the regional or ethnic origins of its employees. 
Foucher analyzes the results of recruiting exams in the public sector published in the 
1977 “Journal official de la République du Senegal,” and bases on an analysis of 4181 
names, he claimed that at least 383 were Joola, corresponding to 9.2% of the total.53 If 
we consider that the Joola represent 5.3% of the Senegalese population according to the 
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1988 census, we can conclude that they were over-represented. Foucher finds also that 
the Joola were concentrated in the lowest qualified employments: Categories C 
(secondary school brevets) and D (primary school certificate).  
Thus, a kind of “social pact” linked the Joola cadres to the Senegalese state. The 
Joola elites were loyal to the State because they were employed by it. When the 
retrenchments began in the 1980s, they felt betrayed by the state and decide to oppose it. 
They promoted Joola unity and identity so as to establish themselves as Joola 
spokespeople, and ultimately to accede to state employment by coalescing as a local 
dominant political class.  Englebert argues that the MFDC elites were not only trying to 
negotiate their (re)integration into Senegal, but more so their local hegemony within 
Senegal.54 As the newspaper “Le Soleil” puts it, the members of the MFDC were 
“…disappointed in their political or professional ambitions and trying to manipulate the 
population for their own profit.”55   
Thus, in Casamance, the MFDC arose because the development of a mass Joola 
consciousness was accompanied by the emergence of new Joola elites, in search of 
opportunities and legitimacy. Casamance separatism might have been inhibited had 
Senegal been willing to maintain the Joola cadres in their jobs. But since Senegal was 
limited by its economic policies, the Joola cadres had to look elsewhere for means to 
pursue their ambitions. By giving voice to a sense of resentment against the dominating 
state in the form of a demand for increased autonomy, the Joola elites have been able to 
assert their right to act as the spokespeople and leaders of the community. Indeed, 
popular grievances are very much like natural resources: both are simply resources that 
elites appropriate in pursuit of their immediate self-interest. 
In constructing a pan-ethnic Joola identity, the rebel leaders found fertile soil in a 
population whose security was threatened by the assimilationist and centralizing state. To 
begin with, there was, in the early 1980s, a widespread and organized support from local 
populations. This took the form of subscriptions: in cash, with many locals buying 
MFDC membership cards for 1000 CFA, or in-kind, usually rice. These subscriptions 
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were channeled through local support committees, which also organized fundraising 
events such as dances, all to support political activism or to feed activists in hiding.56  
Second, one can infer the popularity of the rebellion from the fact that MFDC 
members did not extort money from the civilians or commit robberies against traders or 
farmers. There were no attacks on passenger or goods transport vehicles, either. This 
situation shows that the rebels easily obtained supplies. 
Third, support for the MFDC was visible through the ease with which they were 
able to recruit. For example, a non-separatist told Marut that there was not a single family 
where separatists did not exist.57 MFDC leaders assert that the violence of the army has 
driven many young Casamançais to join the rebellion: “La brutalité aveugle de l’armée 
Sénégalaise a poussé la majeure partie des jeunes Casamançais a rejoindre la 
rébellion.” Moreover, members of the Casamance Catholic church attested that the 
MFDC benefited from the support of the majority of the population.58 
Fourth, although the social basis of the movement is predominantly Joola and the 
combats are located in the Lower Casamance (Le Kasa, Le Blouf, Ziguinchor 
agglomeration), mainly inhabited by the Joola (see map), the sociological composition of 
the MFDC confirmed the popular character of this organization. The list of the persons  
arrested for rebel activities has revealed a majority of peasants and fishermen. But there 
were also waged workers, functionaries (schoolteachers mainly), and students from 
collèges and lycées.59   
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Figure 3.   Main zones of combat between MFDC and Senegalese Forces. 
 
Finally, when the government over-reacted during an MFDC demonstration, and 
then sub-divided Casamance region in 1984, local sympathy with and support for the 
rebels increased further.  
The MFDC has therefore capitalized upon the grievances of the local populations. 
They manipulated the ethnic consciousness and got near universal popular support. 
However, the repression of the movement by the state and the arrest of MFDC leaders 
combined with the indiscriminate escalation of violence lead to a decline in the amount of 
locally–derived revenue, and hence drove the MFDC to seek external support by taking 
advantage of the tensions between Senegal and its neighbors in the 1990s.  The next 
chapter argues that the MFDC's new dependence on external military support in the 
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III. FROM POPULAR SECESSION TO EXTERNAL 
DEPENDENCE (1990-2000) 
There are many different ways neighboring states can be affected by and 
become involved in internal conflicts. Although neighboring states can be 
the passive victims of turmoil in their regions, they are often active 
contributors to military escalation and regional instability: opportunistic 
interventions are common.  
(Michel E. Brown, Ethnic and Internal Conflicts: Causes and 
Implications, page 214) 
Neighboring states find it difficult to avoid becoming enmeshed in nearby 
conflicts and supporting one side or the other.” 




The preceding chapter demonstrated that in the initial years of the movement 
(1982-1990), the MFDC capitalized upon the grievances of the local populations and 
received support from them. This took the form of subscriptions, either in cash, with 
many locals buying MFDC membership cards for 1,000 francs CFA, or in-kind support. 
These were channeled through local support committees, which also organized 
fundraising events such as dances, all to support political activism or to feed activists in 
hiding. However, sustained government repression, particularly the numerous arrests of 
MFDC activists and suspected supporters in the mid-to-late 1980s, ended such funding, 
and with the militarization of the conflict the insurgents had to seek revenues 
elsewhere.60  
The rebellion soon found an alternative source of revenue, taking advantage of the 
hostile relations between Senegal and three of its neighboring countries, Mauritania, The 
Gambia, and Guinea Bissau. Although Senegal suspects Mauritania of supporting the 
MFDC as a consequence of their 1989 border conflict, there is little evidence to 
corroborate this accusation. For this reason, we will limit this chapter to the external 
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support that the MFDC received from The Gambia and Guinea Bissau. Indeed, the 
MFDC began to receive significant assistance from these two neighboring countries in 
the early 1990s; this new source of support permits the rebellion to compensate for the 
evaporation of its popular support. With modern weaponry received from neighboring 
countries, the MFDC escalated the level of violence, not only against the Senegalese state 
but also against the local population. This change of strategy and tactics further reduced 
popular support for the movement.  The present chapter analyzes this second phase of the 
MFDC, during which growing dependence upon external patrons led to a fundamental 
redefinition of the rebellion. 
 
B. CHANGE IN STRATEGIES AND TACTICS 
1. Factors Leading to Changes in Strategies and Tactics 
In the 1990s, a number of factors led to changes in the tactics and strategies of the 
MFDC. Among these, alliances with neighboring governments provided the MFDC with 
modern weaponry for the first time. Second, the signing of a peace accord with the 
Senegalese government in 1990 caused the movement to split into two fronts (Front Nord 
and Front Sud), which, along with access to new technologies led to an escalation of 
violence in the region and the targeting of local populations. Local populations were 
targeted (1) as a strategy to prevent them from cooperating with the central government; 
(2) as a result of the factionalized MFDC moving into areas that supported the rival 
faction, and (3) because the movements could rely more on foreign backing. Finally, 
because the movement had split, the two factions were forced not only to compete against 
the central government but also against themselves, and in the resultant confrontations, 
both sides lost popular support.  
 
2. Escalation of Violence and Negotiations 
The rebel offensive escalated in the early 1990s. Previously limited to sporadic 
attacks against the posts of the national police and the gendarmerie, MFDC assaults were 
now extended to the national army, border posts, and official buildings. These attacks 
occurred over the entire Lower Casamance territory, both north and south of the 
Casamance River (see map). 
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Figure 4.   Escalation of violence over the entire Lower Casamance (from Marut 1999, 
47). 
 
Throughout the two-year offensive (1990-91), the MFDC retained the initiative in 
the attacks. The organization had visibly improved its military capacity, and its attacks 
became more and more deadly for the security forces. For instance, on June 19, 1990, a 
group of government soldiers fell into an ambush led by the MFDC between Santhiaba 
and the Lower Casamance Park.61  
On June 6, 1990, the government responded to the escalation of the rebellion by 
appointing a retired General, Amadou Abdoulaye Dieng, as Casamance Military 
Governor with a mission to repress the rebellion. General Dieng responded to the 
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MFDC’s attacks by arresting hundreds of people accused of harboring terrorists or of 
being sympathetic to their cause. By the beginning of 1991, around three hundred people, 
including Diamacoune Senghor and other MFDC leaders, had been charged with sedition 
and sent to Dakar for trial.62   
Negotiations for a ceasefire soon began, and on May 31, 1991 the first ceasefire 
agreement was signed by Sidy Badji, commander of the military wing of the MFDC 
(Attika), and the Senegalese Defense Minister, Medoune Fall, in Cacheu, Guinea Bissau. 
The agreement provided for the full withdrawal of military forces and an end to 
hostilities, as well as the free movement of people and goods. Diamacoune Senghor and 
350 Casamançais detainees were released.63  
However, signing the agreement augmented the ambitions of the MFDC, which 
made new demands such as an end to political activities by national parties in 
Casamance, the abolition of rural taxation in the area, and restrictions on government 
troop movements.64 Moreover, the MFDC leaders appeared to be politically and morally 
the winners of this episode. They not only proved that they could militarily confront the 
Senegalese army, but also that they could be invited by the government to undertake 
negotiations. In addition, official recognition of the existence of a genuine separatist 
claim in the region granted the movement a measure of political legitimacy.  This success 
convinced the MFDC that it would win if the fighting resumed.  
Nevertheless, the military success of the MFDC was tarnished by a split of the 
movement into two factions: the MFDC (Front Nord) and the MFDC (Front Sud), named 
for their regional areas of operations, north and south of the Casamance River. This 
division emerged following a second round of accords signed in April 1992 in the Bissau 
town of Cacheu, which aimed to consolidate the May 1991 ceasefire.  
The issue at stake in the split, initially, was Diamacoune Senghor’s denunciation 
of the Cacheu Accords for failing to address the MFDC’s central demand for Casamance 
independence. Badji, however, who had negotiated the first accords and advocated a 
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cooperative approach to dealings with the Senegalese government, disagreed. Therefore, 
as Senghor split his followers from the MFDC, creating the Front Sud, Badji and his 
followers regrouped as the MFDC (Front Nord) and retired from active combat against 
Senegalese forces. In exchange, they were allowed to retain de facto control of much of 
the northwest of Bignona department, with few or no Senegalese forces present in the 
area covered. The MFDC (Front Nord) claimed a greater autonomy for the Casamance 
within Senegal. Under the nominal command of Kamougue Diatta, it has its main base at 
Diakaye, on the Bignona-Diouloulou Road, near the Gambian border. Ostensibly pacified 
and engaged in economic development of its zone, the MFDC (Front Nord) is now 
regarded by some as a positive political force of its region.65  The MFDC (Front Sud) 
under the command of Leopold Sagna (and later under the command of Salif Sadio) 
operated south of the Casamance River with its rear bases mainly along both sides of the 
Casamance’s porous forested border with Guinea Bissau. The MFDC (Front Sud) 
meanwhile committed itself to continue fighting for all-out independence.66  
The two factions were based along borders with neighboring countries: 
approximately 2,000 MFDC (Front Sud) members were located close to or in 
neighboring Guinea Bissau, while 1,000 MFDC (Front Nord) were located on both sides 
of the border with The Gambia.67 There was no cooperation between the two entities. 
Each faction claimed it is the real MFDC and tried to discredit the other. The MFDC has 
significantly increased the number of its soldiers, from 700 men in the early 1980s to an 
estimated 3,000 in the 1990s.68 
The MFDC (Front Sud) resumed violence in late 1992 in order to disrupt the 1993 
presidential elections. During this time, systematic persecution of noncombatant 
Casamançais became common, aimed to prevent them from cooperating with central 
government initiatives, especially electoral processes. The MFDC (Front Sud) considered 
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any whom they found in possession of a polling card traitors, and a landmine campaign 
was aimed at discouraging voters from going to the polls. Militarily, the MFDC (Front 
Sud) launched a rocket attack on the Ziguinchor airport and blew up an International 
Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) vehicle with an anti-tank mine. In November 1992, 
seven fishermen from northern Senegal were killed in the village of Pointe-Sainte-
George.69 Despite its efforts at intimidation, the MFDC (Front Sud) did not prevent the 
organization of the elections in Casamance, but they did impact electoral turnout: the 
turnout at the presidential election was 40 percent in Casamance, as opposed to 51.46 
percent nationwide.70  
Following the presidential elections, violence subsided for a time, but picked up 
again in 1995 when the Senegalese army decided to undertake an attempt to eradicate the 
MFDC (Front Sud) from Casamance. In January 1995, the Senegalese government 
interrupted food supplies to the MFDC (Front Sud). Until this point, MFDC (both 
factions) fighters had been provided food by international NGOs with the tacit accord of 
the Senegalese government. This decision by the Senegalese government hit the MFDC 
(Front Sud) fighters who were camping in the bush more than the MFDC (Front Nord) 
members who were undertaking economic activities in their area. Deprived of food 
supplies by the government as a response to the escalation of the violence, the MFDC 
(Front Sud) rebels increased their raids on local villages.71 Marchés Tropicaux pointed 
out that the responsibility for these raids was effectively that of the Front Sud and not of 
the Front Nord.72 La Voix de la Casamance confirmed this assertion in these terms: “the 
confrontation of Sunday took place after the assault on the village in Niaguiss by some 
members of the MFDC who have stolen foodstuffs. Since the ceasefire agreement, 
several dozens of them live clandestinely and have difficulties in feeding themselves; it 
was clarified by the same sources.”73 
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As a result, the MFDC increased its military activities. The resumption of the 
combat extended the violence to the East (le Balantacounda) and the South of Ziguinchor 
(see map supra). The redeployment of the rebellion to the East extended the frontier, 
facilitating the retreat of the rebels into Guinea Bissau.  In April, four French tourists 
disappeared at Cap Skirring, and the Senegalese government accused the MFDC (Front 
Sud) of being responsible for their kidnapping. The MFDC (Front Sud) accused the 
Senegalese army of being responsible. As a result of this incident, five officials of the 
MFDC (Front Sud), including Diamacoune Senghor, were arrested on April 21 and 22. 
Even seriously weakened by the Senegalese offensive, the MFDC (Front Sud)'s 
military capacity remained intact. For example, in July 1995, the insurgents ambushed, 
captured, and then killed 23 Senegalese soldiers at Babonda, near the Guinea-Bissau 
border. Two years later, in August 1997, the Senegalese army’s biggest single loss in the 
whole Casamance conflict occurred at Mandina Mancagne, just southeast of Ziguinchor, 
where 25 soldiers were killed in another ambush. However, many of the MFDC (Front 
Sud)’s bases on both sides of the Guinea Bissau border were destroyed, causing a partial 
deployment to the North of the Casamance River.74 
In 1995, there were new attempts at dialogue. However, the series of ceasefires 
signed by MFDC leaders during the 1990s were intended primarily to buy time to prepare 
for new offensives. The MFDC was not really interested in an end to the violence.75  
Indeed, the MFDC pursued its escalation of violence, despite regular ceasefire 
agreements signed with the government. To illustrate, in August 1997, it initiated a 
surprise attack on the local military barracks of Kandialan, south of Ziguinchor. The 
army declared that it had killed more than 30 rebels, but had lost 25 government soldiers. 
The fighting expanded in Niaguiss sector and in Lower Casamance Park area (see map). 
Because of the offensive of the army, The MFDC (Front Sud) moved to the North, near 
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the Gambian border.76  The Senegalese forces followed the movement of the MFDC to 
the North. The Front Nord initially tried to prevent the army from establishing a military 
post at Djanaki, north of the Casamance River, but an agreement was reached through 
negotiation with the civilian leaders of this faction.77 
 
C. THE MFDC BECOMES LARGELY DEPENDENT ON EXTERNAL 
MILITARY PATRONS 
During this time, both fronts of the MFDC received support from The Gambia 
and Guinea Bissau. As the Front Sud expanded operations into the northern parts of the 
Casamance, and as they increasingly attacked local populations in order to prevent them 
from cooperating with the central government, the Front Sud needed to find other sources 
of support. It found that support in the form of basing and financial support from Guinea-
Bissau. Front Nord, because of its cooperative relationship with the Senegalese 
government, did not rely as much on foreign backing, but nevertheless did receive 
support from The Gambia. This section shows how these countries were helping the 
MFDC and how this movement became dependent upon them. 
 
1. The Gambia 
The collapse of the Senegambian Confederation in August 1989 significantly 
increased tensions between the two countries. Senegal accused The Gambia of allowing 
the secessionists to use its territory as a transit point for Libyan and Iraqi weapons, 
providing a meeting point for representatives of the MFDC, serving as a base from which 
the military wing of the MFDC could launch its attacks on the Lower Casamance, and 
serving as a meeting point between Mauritanian officers and members of the MFDC.78  
Gambian President Yahya Jammeh, a Joola who came to power in a military coup d’état 
in 1994, is believed to “have close links with the Joola-dominated MFDC’s Front Nord 
…The Front Nord is alleged to form the presidential guard at Jammeh’s residence, just 2 
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kilometers across The Gambian border in his home village of Kanilaye, also said to act as 
a supply and trafficking depot for that faction.”79 
The lines between rebels, refugees and local Joola communities in The Gambia 
are blurred. The fluidity of nationality status was well illustrated in 2001 when many 
Casamance Joola - estimated by some to be in the tens of thousands - were registered to 
vote as Gambians in the seriously flawed election that legitimized Jammeh's power.80 For 
a number of years, MFDC leaders such as spokesman Alexandra Djiba; Edmond Bora, 
one of the four national secretaries of the MFDC; and Laurent Diamacoune, a nephew of 
Diamacoune Senghor, were publicly based in Banjul, the capital of the Gambia. 
Jammeh’s ambivalent and at times duplicitous position is comparable to Liberian 
president Charles Taylor’s dealings with the Revolutionary United Front (RUF) in Sierra 
Leone.81 Moreover, Gambian president Jammeh is a good friend of Guinea Bissauan 
Brigadier General Mane, whose support for the MFDC later became even more critical, 
as discussed below.  
Although the importance of the Gambian territory lessened after 1992 when the 
MFDC (Front Nord) decided to opt for economic projects (fishing and farming) financed 
by the government, it regained its crucial role in 1995 when the official government of 
Guinea Bissau began reducing its assistance to the rebels. Indeed, beginning in 1995, 
increasing cooperation between Guinea Bissau and Senegal in the fighting of the 
Casamance rebellion forced the MFDC (Front Sud) to relocate to the Gambian border, 
previously controlled by the Front Nord. As a result, the Front Nord then found itself 
fighting the Front Sud to protect its territory.82  
The Gambia has demonstrated an ability to coordinate activities in support of the 
MFDC to put pressure on Senegal. In the midst of a Senegalese government offensive 
against the MFDC in 1995, for example, Banjul interrupted communications between 
Northern Senegal and Casamance, first by increasing the fares of the ferries crossing the 
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Gambian River, and then by declaring that the ferries were out of order.  At the same 
time, the MFDC (Front Sud) attacked the Senegalese custom post at the Gambian border. 
Observers believe these efforts were coordinated actions between the MFDC (Front Sud) 
and The Gambia because the Gambian authorities wanted the Senegalese to decrease the 
custom controls at the border.83  
The Gambians are also determined to block a Senegalese hegemony in West 
Africa. For instance, to embarrass the Senegalese involvement in the 1998 civil war in 
Guinea Bissau, the Gambians vehemently opposed the ECOMOG intervention, led by 
Senegal, and only condemned the military coup there after the ceasefire was signed.84  
 
2. Guinea Bissau 
In the early 1990s, the Senegalese government was also involved in a 12-year 
dispute with Guinea Bissau over their maritime border. Although both the International 
Arbitration Court in Geneva and the International Court of Justice in The Hague awarded 
the disputed area (believed to be rich in oil) to Senegal, tensions between the two 
countries remained.   
Guinea Bissau has been accused of serving as a safe-haven, staging post and 
major weapons supplier for the MFDC.85  In fact, until the 1998 civil war in Guinea 
Bissau, the most important arms supplier to the MFDC had been the Guinea-Bissauan 
government and military officials.86 
Some facts seem to confirm the Senegalese government’s accusations against 
Guinea Bissau of harboring and supporting the MFDC. First, the press publicized a letter 
dated March 30, 1986 and signed by several MFDC leaders, which was an appeal to a 
neighboring country for arms and explosives. Most observers believed that the country in 
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question was Guinea Bissau.87 Second, the start of the separatist offensive in 1990 
coincided with Guinea Bissauan army attacks against Senegalese objectives at the border. 
Indeed, the so called ‘guerre du pétrole’ (Oil War), during which the Guinea Bissauan 
and Senegalese armies fought at the border, began one month after the MFDC offensive. 
Furthermore, the retreat of MFDC (Front Sud) rebels into Guinea Bissau while the 
artillery of the Guinea Bissau army was in action could be interpreted as Guinea Bissau 
providing cover for the withdrawal of the rebels. Third, the Guinea Bissauan army has 
sometimes supported or even taken part in combat operations in the Casamance. For 
example, in April 2000, the MFDC attacked a Senegalese army post on the southern 
border. Three Senegalese soldiers died, and a Guinean Bissauan soldier was found among 
the 15 attackers also killed, together with the remains of a Guinea-Bissauan army 
vehicle.88  
Finally, and most important, the 1998 civil war in Guinea Bissau was in part a 
result of the Casamance conflict. Although the government of Guinea Bissau, or at least 
President Vieira, began reducing support to the MFDC in 1995, the military under 
Brigadier General Ansumane Mane, chief of staff of the army, continued their support. 
To illustrate, in June 1998 Mane launched a military coup after being scapegoated by 
President Viera for arms supply to the MFDC. The MFDC (Front Sud) sent a contingent 
to Guinea to help Mane’s forces against the Senegalese troops that had been dispatched to 
support President Vieira.89 During this conflict, the MFDC (Front Sud) acquired 82 mm 
mortars, B-10 82 mm recoil-less guns and DShK-38 12.7 mm heavy machine guns.90  In 
May 1999, the Guinea Bissauan parliament undertook an investigation on arms 
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but accused 40 of President’s Vieira’s aides of arming the separatists. The Bissau 
parliament threatened to put the president on trial for failure to halt the illicit arms 
trade.91   
Thus, at the beginning of the 1990s, the MFDC received substantial support and 
benefits from The Gambia and Guinea Bissau and in response came to rely less upon the 
support of local constituents. With the change in the source of its support, the MFDC 
would militarize the conflict by escalating the violence not only against the state but also 
against the local populations. The changes in strategies and tactics would reinforce its 
growing dependence upon external patrons rather than popular support. 
 
D. EROSION OF POPULAR SUPPORT 
Along with these external factors, internal developments also decreased popular 
support for the MFDC. Internally, as the MFDC (Front Sud) moved north of the 
Casamance River, it spread violence to the entire Bignona department, which had been 
calm since 1992 when the Front Nord had begun to cooperate with the central 
government. As Front Sud guerillas fled the army offensive and established new bases in 
Bignona, they came into direct confrontation with both the Front Nord and the 
Senegalese army. Sporadic clashes between them continued into early 1998, as well as 
attacks on civilians mainly by the Front Sud.  
Indeed, removed from their usual areas of operations, the Front Sud was having 
difficulties in obtaining food supplies. MFDC (Front Sud) separatists began to collect 
“contributions” from villagers in the name of the MFDC as a whole, despite the disunity 
of the latter. Villagers were given the choice between ‘subscription’ (or, for young men, 
joining the rebellion), or being beaten or killed. Amnesty International declared that 
villagers who refused to provide food or money to the MFDC, or were suspected of 
collaborating with the Senegalese authorities, were killed by the separatists.92   
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Public opinion about the separatists started to shift when they began attacking 
fishermen from northern Senegal in the name of ‘ethnic purification’ and raiding villages, 
eliminating traitors, robbing peasants of all ethnic and political stripes, and committing a 
battery of human rights abuses. The massacre of 13 civilian travelers at Niahoump, on the 
Transgambienne, on February 16, 1997 shocked many Casamançais. This incident was 
followed, one month later, by the killing of seven more under similar circumstances at 
Belaye, on the Bignona-Diouloulou road. Wolofs were separated from other passengers 
on the basis of their identity cards, and then executed. These atrocities were committed 
by Front Sud fighters displaced from Guinea Bissau.93  
The erosion of the movement’s popular support led to the creation of self-defense 
groups to protect the villagers from the extortions and armed robberies committed by the 
MFDC. Lambert asserts that “at times Joola opposition to the MFDC has been violent. 
For instance, in May 1992 a village paramilitary group in Cabanaou engaged Atika [the 
armed branch of the MFDC] in a military confrontation that reportedly claimed the lives 
of twenty rebels. Another village chased representatives of Atika out of the village when 
they arrived to collect a revolutionary tax.” 94  Moreover, the Collectif des Cadres 
Casamançais, created in 1998 and representing entrepreneurs and professionals from 
Casamance, asked the MFDC to "have the modesty to admit that Casamançais did not 
mandate it to demand the independence of the Casamance… Casamançais are tired of the 
escalation of violence, its endless cycle…We are for the development of the Casamance 
and not for its independence."95  Moreover, in July-August 2000, following protests 
along Kolda region’s southern border about growing insecurity, the local populations 
close to the border demanded better protection and the restitution of stolen livestock, 
vehicles and other possessions.96 
The conflict became too costly for the local population. According to the World 
Bank, many thousands of lives have been lost, hundreds of people injured by mines and 
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unexploded ordnance (UXO), and tens of thousands displaced either internally or 
externally.97  In addition, major constraints on agricultural productivity are now emerging 
as a result of natural resource damage inflicted by salinization, erosion, and deforestation. 
The regional directorate for agriculture in Ziguinchor announced a 19.7 percent drop in 
cereal production-from 41,673 to 33,479 tons-over the 1990-96 periods. According to the 
regional inspectorate for Water and Forest Resources, revenues from public lands fell 
from CFAF 45 million in 1991 to CFAF 17 million in 1997. The fishing and livestock 
sectors have also been affected by the violence. Tourism has been negatively affected, 
with many investors shunning the region for fear of potential customer flight. 
The negative human, social and economic impact of the conflict made the 
population long for peace and stability, which the government promised along with a list 
of other economic and social advantages if the rebellion ended. Indeed, the Senegalese 
officials announced in May 1999 a development package of CFAF 114 billion investment 
in Casamance over the next five years. This important allocation of resources was to be 
devoted to demining, reinforcing border security, providing assistance to displaced 
people, seed supplies, health assistance and the reconstruction of ruined infrastructure. 
The promised bridge across the River Gambia should transform Casamance’s 
communications with the rest of Senegal.98  
Additionally, in 1997 the Government adopted a policy of regionalization as a 
solution to the Casamance conflict. The reform gives to local leaders more authority, 
responsibility, and control over their regional institutions. The regions became 
collectivités locales; that is, elected structures of government with some independence 
from the center. The 10 regions created in 1996 (later expanded to 11 when the region of 
Saint-Louis was divided to create the region of Matam) have both elected councils and a 
state-appointed governor, making them both semi-independent and under the purview of 
the state. Below the regions come two levels of state administration, the départements 
and the arrondissements, which have oversight power over local governments. At the 
local level, governments are elected. Local governments consist of urban communes on 
the one hand and communautés rurales on the other.  
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In order to further isolate the MFDC, Senegal had already persuaded the 
neighboring countries against cooperating with the organization. The Senegalese 
government had signed a bilateral treaty of friendship and cooperation with The Gambia 
on May 25, 1991. Immediately following the signature of this treaty, the Senegalese 
Foreign Affairs Minister met the President of the Gambia, during which they discussed 
problems of stability in the Cassamance. In relation to this, the governmental Newspaper 
Le Soleil mentioned that according to a law recently enacted by the Gambian parliament, 
“Banjul was determined to serve neither as sanctuary nor rear base to terrorist groups 
aimed at one or another country in the area.”99 The desire for cooperation shown by the 
Gambian government, more particularly following the wave of violence that occurred in 
the Casamance in 1990 and 1991, was not only due to the fear of seeing this problem 
spread to the whole sub-region, or the pressure from Dakar, but also the possibility that 
the trade routes from Banjul to Bissau had been periodically disrupted by fighting in the 
Casamance. This cooperation continued when the new Gambian leader, Yaya Jammeh, 
took power in a military coup on July 22, 1994. He has already been pushing The Gambia 
closer to Senegal, speaking of the “one-ness” of the Sene-Gambian people on Senegalese 
television. In an interview with the Senegalese daily Le Soleil, Jammeh also declared his 
intention to fight against tribalism and regionalism.100  
Although in the same year a ruling by the International Court of Justice on the 
maritime border dispute between Senegal and Guinea Bissau granted Senegal control 
over the contested oil reserves, Senegal signed an agreement with Bissau in 1993 that 
provided for joint management and exploitation of the oil reserves. Senegal also 
supported Guinea-Bissau’s entry into the CFA zone, a regional currency that is tied to the 
French franc.101 The two countries signed an agreement reinforcing border controls 
between Senegal and Guinea Bissau. The agreement included the undertaking of joint 
patrols along the border, an exchange of liaison officers and the right of Senegalese 
troops to pursue the separatists into Guinea Bissau territory. Improved relations with 
Senegal might have prompted Bissau to encourage Diamacoune Senghor, the Secretary 
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General of the MFDC, to return to Ziguinchor in 1993 from his covert base in Guinea-
Bissau. Upon his return, Diamacoune called for an immediate cessation of hostilities and 
negotiated a new ceasefire.102 Moreover, Guinea Bissau was the guarantor of the 
ceasefire of May 31, 1991 and July 8, 1993 between the MFDC and the Senegalese 
government. Following the signing of the 1991 ceasefire, Guinea Bissau’s President, J. B. 
Vieira, declared he had no intention of letting the territory of Guinea Bissau be used by 
the Casamance separatists. However, if President Vieira seems ready to cooperate with 
Senegal, it does not mean that his entire government agrees with him (see above).103  
Still, the MFDC did become increasingly isolated from The Gambia and Guinea Bissau.   
Thus, Senegal seemed to have the upper hand, not only in terms of the 
international context but also with regards to its pubic opinion. The MFDC was severely 
weakened. Although these governmental efforts reduced external and popular support for 
the MFDC, this movement remained, however, potentially dangerous in the Casamance 
since it was not disarmed and still created a semi-permanent insecurity in the region 
through calculated occasional skirmishes against the Senegalese forces and the army. 
In the 1990s, despite the evaporation of popular support, the MFDC had 
maintained itself thanks to the assistance received from The Gambia and Guinea Bissau. 
This external support allowed the rebellion not only to escalate the violence against the 
state and the populations but also to sustain itself. While Senegal eventually succeeded in 
persuading both local populations and the neighboring countries to abandon their support 
of the MFDC, the MFDC was able to remake itself again by engaging in the illegal 
exploitation of natural resources in the territories under its control. The next chapter 
analyzes the ‘war economy’ of the MFDC from 2000 onwards, showing how a movement 
initially motivated in large part by grievance, then opportunity, has become one driven 
almost entirely by greed.  
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IV. FROM VIOLENT REBELLION TO WAR ECONOMY (2000-
PRESENT) 
Movements are led by politicians seeking power, and the influence and 
wealth that flow from it. Few would hold ideals to the point of losing 
everything, even if most have only hope to rely on that they will gain 
something in the future. 
Bruce Baker, “Separating the Sheep from the Goats among Africa’s 
Separatist Movements.  Terrorism and Political Violence, Vol. 13, No.1, 
Spring 2001, 82. 
War has increasingly become the continuation of economics by other 
means.  
David Keen, The Economic Functions of Violence on Civil wars,” 1998, 
11. 
 
The preceding chapter analyzed how the MFDC changed its strategy and tactics in 
response to its growing dependence upon external patrons rather than popular support, 
and how this, in turn, redefined the rebellion. The present chapter explains another shift, 
this time from the externally supported, generalized violence of the early 1990s to the 
profit driven insecurity that has prevailed since the early 2000s. Senegal has isolated the 
MFDC (both fronts)104 from its external support by improving its relationship with The 
Gambia and Guinea Bissau and by promising peace and economic development to the 
populations if they abandon their assistance to the rebellion. Despite the fact that 
Senegal's strategy of undermining popular and external support for the MFDC succeeded 
in its immediate goal, Dakar’s policy did not lead to a final resolution of the conflict 
because the MFDC’s civilian and military leaders have adopted new strategies to sustain 
themselves. There is a situation of semi-permanent insecurity in Casamance, which 
provides the MFDC with new resources for its survival. Both fronts of the MFDC are 
now engaged in the illegal exploitation of the natural resources of Casamance because it 
is in the interests of the separatists to prolong the conflict and the geography and 
abundant natural resources in Casamance provide the MFDC withnew means of survival.  
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First, the MFDC engages in the ‘war economy’ because its bush fighters' 
immediate economic interests lead them to continue to fight to maintain informal control 
of Casamance territory in order to exploit its economic resources. As Keen put it, “war 
has increasingly become the continuation of economy by other means. War is not simply 
a breakdown in a particular system, but a way of creating an alternative system of profit, 
power, and even protection.”105 Most of the estimated 2,000-4,000 remaining rebels are 
school drop-outs, who would not get the opportunity to work in a Casamance civil 
service.106 For them, profiting from the war economy has become an end in itself.  They 
joined the MFDC not because they believed in the independence of Casamance region in 
a near future but because joining the MFDC was the only remaining option to improve 
their personal situations.107  This reality has not changed.  
As MFDC fighters began to be motivated more by profit than the ideological goal 
of Casamance independence, they began a new strategy of occupying different 
economically advantageous areas. In this new phase of the conflict, they spread violence 
to perpetuate the insecurity that facilitated their economic enterprises in the region.108 
Rather than occupying all of Casamance, since the early 2000s, MFDC forces have 
concentrated their efforts on controlling only the areas in which natural resources and 
related economic activities are located. The geographical position of Casamance, which 
provides easy access to trade with neighboring counties, and the diverse array of 
resources (discussed below), provide material with which the MFDC can support itself.  
In order to monopolize these resources, however, the movement has had to 
displace the local populations who had already been using the assets to sustain 
themselves. Evans says for instance that “the MFDC (Front Sud) holds areas, particularly 
in the border zone, from which it has displaced civilian populations through exaction, 
robbery, terror or sowing landmines, and has destroyed their houses. Some IDPs in 
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Ziguinchor report that they or their family members have been attacked by MFDC 
fighters when they had tried to return to their home villages.”109 Likewise, in parts of the 
Buluf, in the Ziguinchor region, the MFDC (Front Nord) prevents the villagers from 
exploiting timber trees, particularly cail-cedrat (Khaya Senegalensis or red wood). The 
MFDC (Front Nord) controls its areas through an informal network of associates. 
Sometimes, it tries to comply with the 1964 National Domain Act by requesting, for 
example, an authorization to use communal land from the rural council.  However, people 
argue that the council did not decide freely since a representative of the rebel movement 
was present during the deliberations. Most of the time, the MFDC (Front Nord) uses 
intimidation and force in support of its economic activities, instead.110  
The MFDC has been able to engage in these activities because Casamance has 
abundant natural resources. Indeed, Casamance is the most fertile region of Senegal. The 
“green” Casamance (as it is often called) is considered as the granary of Senegal. Its 
dense vegetation contrasts with the semi-arid character of the remaining Senegalese 
territory. It is sandwiched between Guinea Bissau and The Gambia which serve as 
driving forces in the regional war economy because both countries provide the two 
factions of the MFDC with buying power, access to national and international markets, 
and processing facilities for the conflict goods. Moreover, the economic activities 
between Casamance and these two countries are facilitated by strong, secular, 
sociocultural ties.111 
The MFDC (Front Nord) and the MFDC (Front Sud) extract timber and wood 
fuels in the territories under their respective control. Evans argues that “the most lucrative 
and certainly the most contentious economic activity of the MFDC (Front Nord) is the 
exploitation of the rich forests of Bignona department. The Front Nord has a sawmill at 
its main base at Dikaye, just off the main road between Bignona and the Gambia’s urban 
centers.”112 MFDC (Front Sud) cuts timber in Bayot and Bissine Forêts classées for sale 
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in Guinea Bissau and in Ziguinchor. It processes and sells timber in bordering Guinean 
Bissau towns such as Sao Domingos, Ingore, and Farim. Overall, timber is more 
important as a ‘conflict good’ to the MFDC (Front Nord) than to the MFDC (Front Sud). 
In effect, most of the roads under MFDC (Front Sud) are mined, making the use of 
vehicles as a means of transport more dangerous.113 
Wood fuels, while important to both factions, are also more important for the 
Front Nord than the Front Sud. Although the extraction and trade of wood fuels near the 
Gambian border began before the Casamance conflict, they increased significantly with 
its onset. Indeed, travelers going or coming by car to The Gambia can easily see charcoal 
production on the Senegalese side of the border.114  
Cashews and other tree crops are also exploited by the MFDC fighters. The 
Casamance region annually produces about 10,000 tons of cashews.115 The orchards are 
more abundant in the Guinea Bissau border zone than in other areas, which makes this 
resource more lucrative for the Front Sud than the Front Nord. In fact, the MFDC (Front 
Sud) obtains most of its revenue from cashews. The Front Sud annually harvests about 
200-300 tons that it sells either to dealers in Ziguinchor and the Guinea Bissau towns of 
Sao Domingos and Ingore, or which it exchanges for rice or arms. Cashews are the main 
crop export of Guinea Bissau, representing around 20 per cent of the country’s GDP and 
90 percent of export earnings.116 In 2000, world cashew prices were 300-500 CFA 
($0.45-0.75)/kg.117 Because Guinea Bissau relies heavily on cashew exports, it provides a 
ready market for the rebel’s productive efforts, to the point that Sud Quotidien described 
the border zone as the ‘granary’ of the rebels.118 No data are available to evaluate extent 
of harvesting cashews by the Front Nord; the degree of this movement’s involvement is, 
however, probably less because there are fewer cashew orchards north of the Casamance 
River.  
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The rebels dominate the trade in some landmined zones near the Guinea Bissau 
border and around Ziguinchor, in areas abandoned by, or inaccessible to civilians, and 
their domination of the cashew industry can be measured by how patterns of warfare 
correspond to the harvest and trade seasons. For example, according to Marut, during the 
cashew season (April-June), MFDC combatants can often be seen harvesting, trading or 
processing locally. So many of the militants are involved in the trade that this period 
often witnesses intensified fighting before the season as the MFDC fighters attempt to 
gain control over the orchards, followed by a short ceasefire as they harvest and trade the 
crops.119 At other times, the fighters escalate violence to get access and control of a zone 
rich in cashews. This is the explanation by Marut of the increased attacks by MFDC 
(Front Sud) on villagers in the Balantacounda. This area is known for the diversity and 
richness of its orchards.120  
Mangoes and citrus fruits are similarly harvested by the factions of the MFDC, 
mainly from orchards abandoned or inaccessible because of landmines. These trees fruits 
are sold through the black market. For example, the Front Sud fighters harvest mangoes 
and oranges from the border zone, and market them via retailers in Sao Domingos or 
Ziguinchor.121 Other existing channels that MFDC factions could use include smuggling 
Casamance mangoes to The Gambia and Guinea Bissau.122 
Cannabis is another crucial conflict good in the Lower Casamance, particularly in 
the Karone Isles, between Kafountine and the lower reaches of the Casamance River (see 
map). This area is difficult to reach by road but offers good access by boat to the river 
and the sea, and proximity to The Gambia. Cannabis cultivation is well organized in this 
area; despite government and NGO attempts to stop it through prosecution, anti-drugs 
publicity and incentives for legal crops, it remains more profitable than alternative, legal 
livelihoods, so farmers are unwilling to give it up.123 (See Map)  
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Figure 5.   Cannabis cultivation and Casamance Conflict (From Marut 1999, 283). 
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Since the early 1980s, MFDC fighters have reportedly earned revenue from 
cannabis directly or by claiming taxes to other producers.124 MFDC fighters produce and 
trade cannabis in their respective zones, taking advantage of the little or no presence of 
Senegalese forces. For example, the Front Nord grows cannabis in its ‘pacified’ zone 
(Kafountine and Sindian districts) and possesses an entrepôt in the Gambian President’s 
Kanilaye village, where it exchanges cannabis for arms and other supplies. The MFDC 
(Front Sud) grows cannabis along the Guinea border.125 Both factions sell their product 
through existing channels in Lower Casamance, Dakar, and other northern Senegalese 
cities as described by several reports from the Senegalese press.126 However, the largest 
market is The Gambia; the cannabis from Lower Casamance is transported to that 
country via maritime and overland routes.127 The Lower Casamance cannabis trade is 
also linked to extensive drug and arms-trafficking networks along the West African coast. 
According to Evans, “MFDC fighters have reportedly exchanged cannabis for weapons, 
and fishing boats carrying both weapons and drugs, including hard drugs, have been 
seized by Senegalese authorities near the Gambian border and Dakar.”128  
Livestock and bushmeat are another component of the war economy. The 
Senegalese press often reports theft of cattle at the Guinea Bissau border.129 During the 
escalation of violence in the 1990s, MFDC (Front Sud) fighters have been accused of 
taking the livestock left by owners fleeing the combat zones. Furthermore, those fighters 
have also intentionally attacked border villages in order to acquire their livestock.130  
Moreover, the deliberate cattle raiding in southern Kolda border villages by the MFDC 
(Front Sud) is considered the main factor that forced local populations to picket the 
border in the 2000 rainy season.131  
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Bushmeat is another conflict good in Casamance. Indeed, hunting and consuming 
or selling game such as antelope, porcupine, and monkey are parts of the Joola culture. 
Evans believes that “the Front Sud exploits bushmeat from abandoned areas as a source 
of revenue; on forest bases, at least during past ceasefire periods, maquisards made 
doeskin bags, purses and shoes for sale, via intermediaries, at Ziguinchor’s tourist 
market. Rebels of both camps fish: the Front Nord was given fishing equipment by 
donors.”132 The Lower Casamance National Park covers an area of about 5,000 hectares 
in Oussouye department, near the Guinea Bissau border. Its rich fauna is exploited for 
bushmeat by the Front Sud.133  
Nevertheless, the illicit trading by the MFDC is jeopardizing the natural resource 
base of the Casamance region. According to some estimates, fishing resources are being 
over-exploited and the fisheries sector is in need of a general reorganization. Similarly, 
the forestry and arboriculture sector must be revitalized so that it can achieve its full 
potential. Forests, including those that are classified, have been under intense pressure.134 
There is considerable evidence of impoverishment of some species (ven and cail-cedrat) 
in the Lower Casamance forests. Overexploitation of forests in the Front Nord zone is 
now so widespread that the rebels themselves called a meeting in June 2000 to address 
the problem.135  
The MFDC (Front Sud) also gains revenue through exactions and armed 
robberies on its constituencies. But this was not always so: as mentioned earlier, in the 
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1980s the MFDC as a unique organization at first enjoyed wider support from the Lower 
Casamance populations, who funded the movement through subscriptions or ‘gifts.’ 
Harsh exactions only became frequent when the MFDC lost its popular support. It then 
gave the population a choice between ‘subscription’ or being beaten or killed.136 In the 
era of the war economy, such exactions assume the form of armed robberies and looting 
of shops and houses often after attacks on state symbols, which have become relatively 
common sources of funds for the Front Sud separatists. After stopping the vehicles, the 
rebels dispossessed the passengers of their belongings (cash, luggage, wares, and 
sometimes even their clothing). Passengers trying to resist or escape are beaten or killed. 
A vehicle and some selected passengers are sometimes temporarily taken to help move 
the loot to a safe location. The loot is used by the Front Sud rebels for their own needs or 
sold through existing channels in Guinea-Bissau, The Gambia, and Ziguinchor.137   
Humanitarian aid is also a component of the war economy. Humanitarian aid may 
exacerbate conflict in four ways: feeding militants, sustaining and protecting militants’ 
dependents, providing legitimacy to combatants, and supporting a war economy.138  
Direct assistance to militants relieves them of having to find food themselves. Even if 
assistance does not directly sustain the militants, it can support their war aims by aiding 
their civilian families and supporters. In addition, humanitarian assistance shapes 
international opinion about the actors in a crisis by providing international legitimacy to a 
group’s political goals. Finally, militants can use relief resources to finance conflict. It is 
not uncommon for rebel leaders to levy a war tax on the refugee population, 
commandeering a portion of all rations and salaries. Rebel leaders can also divert aid 
when they control the distribution process.  
During the Rwanda refugee crisis, for example, militant leaders diverted large 
amounts of aid by inflating population numbers and pocketing the excess. Armed groups 
often raid warehouses and international compounds to steal food, medicine, and 
equipment. Thousands, if not millions, of dollars of relief resources, including vehicles 
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and communication equipment, are stolen every year. For example, in the mid-1990s, aid 
organizations curtailed their operations in Liberia after the theft of $20 million in 
equipment during the civil war there. The International Committee of the Red Cross 
reported that: 
the level of diversion by the factions had reached a systematic and planned 
level, that it was integrated into the war strategy…It was obvious that the 
factions were opening the doors to humanitarian aid, up to the point where 
all the sophisticated logistics had entered the zones: cars, radios, 
computers, telephones. When all the staff was there, then the looting 
would start in a quite systematic way.139  
Because of the large numbers of IDPs and refugees from the Casamance conflict, 
humanitarian assistance has become a factor in the war economy. A census in 1998 by 
the NGO Caritas gave a total of 62,638 internally displaced persons and refugees. 
UNHCR sources estimate that there are 10,000-13,000 Senegalese refugees in The 
Gambia and 30,000 in Guinea Bissau.140 Although the MFDC is not an aid dependent 
organization like the SPLA in Sudan, it was supplied food by some agencies with official 
support during ceasefires. This was to ensure that rebels would not be forced into 
banditry by hunger (thus protecting the civilian population) and as an act of goodwill, all 
to facilitate dialogue. Medicines have similarly been supplied to the rebels with 
government permission. Lists of requirements, sent by one Front Sud element to agencies 
in Ziguinchor at the start of the wet season in recent years, included antibiotics, 
antimalarials, vermifuges and rehydration salts. The government continues to deliver 
food to the MFDC fighters. The independent newspaper Walfadjri reported that on 
December 20, 2005, at a meeting held in Guinea Bissau between the Association of the 
Cadres Casamançais, the Front Nord, and Guinea Bissau officials, a representative of the 
MFDC (Front Nord) recommended that the rice be delivered to the Front Nord through 
the Gambian Red Cross and to the Front Sud through local businessmen chosen by the 
Front Sud.141  
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MFDC fighters have also benefited indirectly from relief aid for civilians. In 
effect, food given to refugees in both Guinea Bissau and The Gambia has supported 
rebels there to a limited extent. Moreover, the humanitarian aid designated to rural 
populations has sometimes been targeted by the rebels.142 In an interview, a Red Cross 
officer countered that, normally, soldiers are dispatched to protect civilian populations 
still in place after an attack and hence secure aid distribution.143 The economic stakes in 
reconstruction and demobilization are relatively high. There is increasing contest for 
control of aid flowing into the region in support of peace and development, with various 
political, civil and MFDC actors vying to secure benefits.  
MFDC leaders also have their eyes on the Dome Flore oil fields discovered in 
1965 and containing up to one billion barrels of heavy crude.144 (see map) 
 
 
Figure 6.   Dôme Flore Oil and Casamance conflict (From Marut 1999, 397) 
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In comparison, rebel groups in Chad and Angola seemed to be motivated by the 
same resource logic. In the south of Chad where oil fields have been discovered, 
movements like the Armed Forces for a Federal Republic (FARF) accepted the signature 
of a ceasefire agreement only when they were offered share in the oil production. In the 
UNITA case, Le Billion asserts that “aside from directly financing the conflict, 
continuing oil and diamond revenues act as strong disincentives for rival groups to reach 
any sustained agreement on political and economic reforms…”145 
 
A. SPLITS WITHIN THE MFDC 
Sources of revenue are important not only because of their impact on the 
functioning of the movement, but also because they can be linked to internal splits within 
the MFDC, as well. Unlike the MFDC military leaders whose economic interests lead 
them to continue to fight, the MFDC civilian leaders, who need access to state 
employment or support, have become dependent on financial transfers from the 
Senegalese government. Senegal provides money to MFDC political leaders who 
abandon separatist claims.  The privately owned daily, Le Quotidien, revealed in 
September 2005 that the government had allocated FCFA 16 million to the movement's 
fighters and FCFA 5.5 million to "MFDC political leaders" during the previous one and a 
half years.146 In addition, critics of Krumah Sane, chief of the external wing of the 
MFDC who is living in France as a French citizen, assert the reasons he opposes a 
peaceful resolution to the war have less to do with the MFDC’s commitment to an 
independent Casamance than the financial benefit that Sane receives by pocketing 
contributions for the MFDC. In return, Nkrumah Sane accused some MFDC leaders such 
as Jean Marie Biagui and Ansumane Badji of receiving millions of CFA Francs daily 
from the Senegalese government.147  Others in the MFDC hold the Senegalese 
government responsible for having corrupted some of its members, dating back to the 
creation of a Front Nord and a Front Sud in the early 1990s. Thus, the distribution of 
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finances has become a divisive issue, with accusations of misappropriations of external 
funds exchanged between factions of the political wing. 
However, having been deprived of external and internal support, the funding of 
the MFDC civilian leaders by the government is crucial. The importance of this funding 
explains the panic among the MFDC civilian leaders when President Wade threatened in 
2000 to end their subsidies. The MFDC civilian leaders demonstrated an unusual 
willingness to comprise to avoid such a dramatic outcome. Some of them went to Dakar 
to meet with President Wade’s staff. Others contacted the RADDHO (Rencontre 
Africaine Des Droits de L’ Homme), a human rights Senegalese NGO, or the Collective 
des Cadres Casamançais, for a continuation of aid and negotiations.148 In November 
2000, Diamacoune complained to President Wade that he was no longer receiving state 
subsidies while having “important local charges.”149 On April 18, 2003, he again sent a 
letter to the Senegalese President to demand a plane for the transport of its delegation to 
Banjul and CFA 3 million to cover the expenses of their sojourn in The Gambia (see 
letter attached).150 The civilian leadership of the Front Nord and Front Sud are all trying 
to get recognized by Dakar as separatist leaders willing to compromise. The leaders of 
the MFDC (both civilian factions) wanted to have access to state resources and use these 
transfers to reinforce their local power, wealth, and influence.  
Clearly, in the 2000s, the MFDC has demonstrated, once again, its capacity to 
sustain itself by adapting to any governmental policy aimed at neutralizing it. When the 
government finally succeeded in undermining its popular and external support, the 
MFDC simply adopted another new strategy to sustain itself. This strategy is twofold: the 
civilian leaders accept money from the government, while the military engage in a ‘war 
economy’ by exploiting the natural resources in the areas they control. The question is 
therefore how to solve the Casamance conflict since the MFDC constantly manages to 
circumvent the different strategies of the Senegalese authorities.  
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V. CONCLUSIONS AND POLICY IMPLICATIONS 
This thesis has demonstrated that fundamental changes in the strategies of the 
secessionist organization “Mouvement des Forces Démocratiques de la Casamance” 
(MFDC) in the Casamance region over the last two decades have been caused by changes 
in the nature of resources available to it. From a popular grievance-based insurgency in 
the 1980s, “living off the land” with the support of its constituency, it transformed itself 
into an instrument at the disposal of neighboring countries during the 1990s. However, as 
the geopolitics of the region shifted, external sources of support began to dry up, and 
having squandered the good will of the local population, the MFDC became increasingly 
reliant on revenue derived from the growing ‘war economy’ in the early 2000s. Moving 
from one support base to another, it has pragmatically altered tactics and objectives.  This 
adaptability has important implications for our understanding of post-Cold War civil 
conflicts, and for governments' efforts to resolve them. 
 
A. IMPLICATIONS OF THE MFDC CASE FOR THE GREED V. 
GRIEVANCE DEBATE 
The greed v. grievance debate tends to present grievance-based rebellions as 
being driven by a moral commitment to redressing the grievances of a mass constituency, 
and greed-based rebellions as being driven by narrow profit-seeking.  In other words, 
rebels are either criminals motivated by private greed or are political actors seeking to 
ameliorate collective grievance.151 In the Casamance case, the elite leadership of the 
MFDC has been consistently motivated by its own political and economic ambitions.  As 
circumstances and available resources have changed over time, elites shifted strategies, 
without changing the ultimate goal: their own empowerment.  This suggests that the very 
distinction between greed and grievance requires closer examination.  In Casamance, 
popular grievances have been a resource at the disposal of ambitious elites; very much 
like externally supplied arms or illicitly traded commodities.  Which resource they have 
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chosen to rely upon at any given time had very little to do with moral commitments or 
ultimate objectives.  Rather, the choice reflected a simple rational cost-benefit analysis. 
In the first instance, MFDC leaders instrumentalized the perceived and legitimate 
grievances of the local population as a platform from which to reinsert themselves into 
positions of state power. In the early 1980s they were very successful in mobilizing the 
masses, and popular support for the MFDC was nearly universal. In the late 1980s, 
however, popular support for the MFDC started eroding due both to the repressive 
actions undertaken by the Senegalese government and the lassitude of the population. 
The MFDC also understood that it could not reach its goals with its rudimentary 
weaponry. Then, it took advantage of the difficult relationship between Senegal and its 
neighbors in the 1990s to get money and arms from the latter. This external support 
permitted the rebellion to maintain military and political pressure on the government of 
Senegal. The MFDC leaders hoped its increased military capacity would allow them to 
leverage better terms of integration into the state for its members and/or derive material 
benefits in continuing low-intensity warfare in the Casamance region.152 
However, the government succeeded in getting the civilian leaders of both 
factions to move away from their independence claim. Since the 1999 Banjul Congress, 
they no longer called for independence; instead they demanded better investment and 
support from Dakar. In exchange for their willingness to cooperate, the Senegalese 
government provides the civilian leaders of both MFDC factions with monthly 
payments.153 The MFDC civilian leaders use these transfers to reinforce their local 
power. In effect, the flow of resources from the state enhances the separatists’ local 
control and gives them credibility as local patrons. Thus, the conflict remains a vehicle 
for the different MFDC civilian leaders to achieve elite status and benefit from state 
resources.  
With Gambian support beginning to wane, the government also succeeded in 
purchasing the defection of some MFDC military leaders, who, as the MFDC (Front 
Nord), in 1992 agreed to abandon violence in return for funding of their socio-economic 
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projects in the northern areas of Casamance that they controlled.  This faction of the 
MFDC leadership calculated that with external and local support declining, its ambitions 
would be best served by establishing de facto autonomy in the area under their control.   
The remaining MFDC leadership, as the MFDC (Front Sud), continued to receive 
external support from Guinea Bissau throughout the 1990s, mostly as a result of the 
instability and state collapse in that country.  (The withdrawal of support by the President 
did not translate into the withdrawal of support by the armed forces or other important 
political elites.)  As a result, the MFDC (Front Sud) fought on. However, the increased 
cooperation between Guinea Bissau and Senegal in the late 1990s would eventually 
weaken and isolate the MFDC (Front Sud). The organization then opted for a strategy 
more similar to that of the MFDC (Front Nord), e.g. by exploiting the resources in the 
areas it controlled.  
Moreover, by the end of the 1990s, the civilian leaders of both factions moved 
away from both the extensive use of violence and their independence claims. In effect, 
since the 1999 Banjul Congress, they have no longer called for independence; instead 
they have demanded better investment and support from Dakar. In response to the MFDC 
civilian leaders’ shift to resource logic, the Senegalese government provides the civilian 
leaders of both MFDC factions with monthly payments.154 The MFDC civilian leaders 
use these transfers to strengthen their local power. In effect, by redistributing government 
resources through informal networks, they establish themselves as informal sources of 
authority. So, the flow of resources from the state enhances the separatists’ local control 
and gives them credibility as local patrons.  It permits them at the same time to achieve 
elite status and benefit from state resources.  
As the civilian leadership moved to establish a political-economic power base for 
itself, both MFDC military factions split from their respective political wings, and 
continued to use low-intensity warfare tactics in support of their own resource extraction 
strategies.  This is not surprising since most of the fighters are school drop-outs who 
would have few employment options in a Casamance administration. Where civilian 
elites have been consistently motivated by political ambitions, most MFDC fighters have 
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been consistently motivated by short term economic gain rather than moral commitment 
to the cause. As early as 1995, MFDC fighters began a new strategy of occupying 
different economically advantageous areas at harvest time, while expanding insecurity in 
the entire Casamance region. By the early 2000s, these activities had become the 
mainstay of the insurgency, as earlier strategies fell away.  Illicit trade provides 
combatants with enough resources to resist repeated Senegalese attempts to fully 
demobilize and disarm them.  
Although both grievance and greed do exist in Casamance, what the case study 
suggests is that insurgent leaders (driven by individual and class interests) have used 
grievances, imported arms, and natural resources in much the same way. At the end of the 
day, the Casamance case reaffirms Baker's assertion that “movements are led by 
politicians seeking power, and the influence and wealth that flow from it...”155  In 
Casamance, they have done so by whatever means are available.  Thus, a final solution to 
the Casamance conflict requires that the Senegalese government find a way to integrate 
the MFDC leaders in the short term, while working toward establishing an institutional 
order which cannot be hijacked by the next set of ambitious elites.  In consolidating such 
an institutional order, the government of Senegal must simultaneously address 
grievances, forestall greed, and maintain good relations with its neighbors. Identifying the 
precise means by which this might be accomplished is beyond the scope of this research.  
However, I hope that the analysis presented here will be helpful to Senegalese 
government officials in their efforts to design such a strategy and finally bring lasting 
peace to Casamance. 
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APPENDIX A: BANJUL NEGOTIATION BETWEEN SENEGALESE 
GOVERNMENT AND MFDC IN 1999.  
NEGOCIATION GOUVERNEMENT DU SENEGAL/MFDC  
                    POUR LA PAIX EN CASAMANCE (1999) 
                                        -----o------ 
Résolution relative à une cessation des hostilités en Casamance. 
  
Le gouvernement sénégalais et les représentants attitrés du MFDC se sont retrouvés à 
Banjul (Gambie) le 26 décembre 1999 en vue de recherches des solutions pour le retour 
de la paix en Casamance. 
Le gouvernement de la République du Sénégal et le MFDC condamnent avec la plus 
grande énergie la violence armée comme mode d’expression. 
En prélude aux travaux et pour manifester davantage leur engagement sans faille pour le 
retour immédiat d'une paix définitive en Casamance, 
Les deux parties décident : 
- La cessation immédiate des combats, des actes armés isolés et ou collectifs, des 
enlèvements de personnes, des pillages des biens et tous autres actes de violence en 
Casamance. 
- Elles s'engagent ainsi à respecter le cessez-le-feu conclu le 08 juillet 1998 à Ziguinchor. 
-Dans ce cadre, les deux parties s'engagent solennellement à créer, à maintenir et à 
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APPENDIX B: 2000 BANJUL PEACE ACCORD BETWEEN 
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APPENDIX C: 2004 PROTOCOL ON DDR BETWEEN SENEGAL 
AND MFDC 
PROTOCOLE D'ACCORD SUR LA DEMOBILISATION-REINSERTION 
    Entre 
L'Etat du Sénégal et le Mouvement des Forces Démocratiques de la Casamance (MFDC) 
pour la mise en oeuvre de certains aspects du Programme de Démobilisation-Réinsertion 
des combattants du MFDC et familles de l'Agence Nationale pour la Relance des 
Activités économiques et sociales en Casamance. 
Dans le présent protocole d'accord, l'Etat du Sénégal et le  Mouvement des Forces 
Démocratiques de la Casamance sont dénommés les parties.  Vu l'Accord de paix du 
trente décembre deux mille quatre, les parties conviennent de leur participation respective 
au programme de Démobilisation-Réinsertion des combattants du MFDC et familles par 
l'ANRAC ainsi qu'il suit: 
   Article premier: Objectifs. 
  L'objectif opérationnel du programme de Démobilisation-Réinsertion est de:  
     - démobiliser et de réinsérer les ex-combattants du MFDC; 
     - réintégrer de façon durable ces démobilisés, les déplacés et réfugiés ou tout autre 
groupe rendu vulnérable par le conflit dans le tissu socio-économique de la région 
naturelle de Casamance. 
A son terme, ce programme aboutit à la disparition totale des effectifs militaires du 
MFDC.  
    Article 2: Mise en oeuvre du programme de Démobilisation-Réinsertion. 
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  Conformément au décret 2004-822 du 1° juillet 2004, l'ANRAC est chargée de la mise 
en oeuvre du programme de Démobilisation-Réinsertion, en liaison avec les partenaires 
au développement et organisations internationales et non gouvernementales. Elle dispose 
à cet effet de la Direction de la Démobilsation-Réinsertion-Réintégration. 
 Article 3: Participation des Forces Armées au programme de Démobilisation-
Réinsertion-Réintégration (DRR). 
 Les forces Armées participent directement à la première phase du DRR, celle dite de 
Recencement-Désarmement. Elles désignent à cet effet un officier qui compose avec un 
représentant du MFDC et un tiers neutre un Comité de désarmement chargé de délivrer 
des titres d'identité civile provisoires aux démobilisés et de récupérer leurs armes au fur 
et à mesure. 
  En outre les Armées mettent sur pied une Equipe de destruction des armes 
exclusivement composée de militaires chargés de détruire au jour le jour,après 
enregistrement, les armes collectées. 
  Il peut être créé selon les besoins plusieurs comités de désarmement et plusieurs 
Equipes de destruction des armes. Dans ce cas, la participation est modulée en 
conséquence. 
  Article 4: Participation du MFDC au programme de Démobilisation-Réinsertion-
réintégration. 
  Le MFDC met sur pied et en oeuvre un Bureau de Démobilisation pour gérer les aspects 
militaires du programme. Le personnel et la gestion de ce Bureau sont de sa 
responsabilité en liaison  avec des représentants d'organisations parties au processus. Il 
travaille avec la direction compétente de l'ANRAC auprès de laquelle il assure une 
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fonction d'appui et de conseil. A cette fin un document définira formellement les termes 
et procédures retenus pour le cadre de leurs relations et la coordination constante 
nécessaire au déroulement du programme. 
  Fait à Dakar le 30 décembre 2004 
 Pour le Mouvement des  Forces                       Pour la république du Sénégal 
 Démocratiques de la Casamance                    S.E M. Ousmane NGOM, Ministre  
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APPENDIX D: 2004 GENERAL PEACE AGREEMENT BETWEEN 
SENEGAL AND MFDC 
ACCORD GENERAL DE PAIX ENTRE LE GOUVERNEMENT DE LA 
REPUBLIQUE DU SENEGAL ET LE MOUVEMENT DES FORCES 
DEMOCRATIQUES DE LA CASAMANCE (MFDC) 
 
                                           Préambule 
  
Le gouvernement de la République du Sénégal (ici désigné par l'Etat) et le Mouvement 
Démocratique des Forces de la Casamance (ici désigné par le MFDC) les deux ici 
désignés par ''les Parties'', en présence d'ambassadeurs d'Etats amis, de représentants 
d'organisations régionales, internationales, humanitaires et non gouvernementales : 
Conscients des effets désastreux provoqués par plus de vingt ans de conflit et de combats 
en Casamance, notamment la régression économique de la région, des souffrances des 
populations ainsi que des risques encourus du fait de la présence de mines anti-personnel   
Conscients des raisons de l'échec des accords précédents et déterminées à en tenir compte 
présentement; 
Convaincus de l'inutilité d'une solution militaire et que seul un engagement solennel des 
combattants du MFDC derrière l'Abbé Auguste Diamacoune SENGHOR peut mettre un 
terme aux hostilités; 
Convaincus de la nécessité d'instaurer un climat de confiance entre interlocuteurs 
responsables et déterminés à aller de l'avant après deux décennies de méfiance; 
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Réaffirmant la justesse des frustrations ressenties par une partie des populations de la 
Casamance mais aussi la nécessité d'y apporter des mesures correctives par la mise en 
oeuvre d'un programme de développement spécifique à cette région naturelle. 
 Conviennent de ce qui suit : 
  
Article premier : DE L'OBJET DU PRESENT ACCORD 
 1. La loi d'amnistie déjà entrée en vigueur, l'Etat s'engage à assurer, en Casamance 
comme partout sur l'ensemble du territoire, la sécurité générale, la libre circulation des 
personnes et des biens, à garantir en conformité avec la constitution l'exercice des libertés 
fondamentales, en particulier celles de pensée et d’expression afin de promouvoir le 
dialogue politique dans la région naturelle de Casamance. 
 2. Le MFDC décide solennellement de renoncer définitivement à la lutte armée et à 
l'usage de la violence pour mener le combat politique qu'il estime devoir conduire 
Article 2 : DE LA GARANTIE ET CONSOLIDATION DE L’Accord 
1.Afin de veiller sur le processus de paix et de régler de façon pacifique les éventuels 
litiges pouvant survenir, il est crée  un Conseil de Surveillance de l'Accord de Paix 
(CSAP) composé de représentants de l'Etat, du MFDC, de la société civile, et de toute 
organisation ressource. Seule l'interprétation des dispositions de l'Accord de Paix et des 
protocoles annexes à l'exclusion des infractions pénales et litiges manifestement civils 
relèvent de la compétence du Conseil. Il s'autosaisit d'initiative pour prévenir les 
difficultés et peut être saisi par toute personne ou structure impliquée dans le processus 
de paix et la reconstruction de la Casamance. 
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 2. Les Parties s'engagent à mettre sur pied un groupe d'observation composé de 
représentants du gouvernement, de militaires, d'ex combattants du MFDC et de 
représentants de l'aile politique du MFDC chargé de mettre en oeuvre le processus de 
démobilisation de l'aile militaire du MFDC et du stockage de ses armes sous le contrôle 
du CICR, de la RADDHO et de l'AJAC. 
3. Le MFDC s'engage à cantonner, désarmer et démobiliser sa composante militaire selon 
les procédures objet du protocole sur la démobilisation - réinsertion - réintégration. 
 4. Les Parties fourniront à l'ANRAC toute information de nature à faciliter le programme 
de dépollution de la région. Dans ce cadre, la participation de chacune des Parties à ce 
volet pacifique de la reconstruction fait l'objet d'un protocole annexé au présent accord. 
 5. Les Parties s'engagent à désigner immédiatement des délégués dans la Commission de 
concertation chargée de démarrer sans délais, les négociations sincères. Le MFDC peut se 
faire assister par toute personne ressource, s'il le juge utile et nécessaire. 
 ARTICLE 3 : DE LA REINSERTION DES ANCIENS COMBATTANTS 
 1. L’Etat du Sénégal accepte à titre exceptionnel d'intégrer à leur demande les ex- 
combattants du MFDC remplissant les conditions d'instruction, d'aptitude physique et 
médicale et âgés de moins de 25 ans dans les corps paramilitaires. 
 2. Les Parties acceptent le principe d'organiser avec le concours de l'Agence Nationale 
pour la Relance des Activités économiques et sociales en Casamance, l' ANRAC, 
l'encadrement nécessaire en vue d'aider les ex combattants du MFDC qui le souhaitent à 
monter et faire financer des projets générateurs de revenus dans les secteurs qui les 
intéressent. 
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 3. Les Parties engagent le Collectif des cadres casamançais, les notabilités coutumières 
et religieuses de la Casamance à développer une dynamique de pardon et de 
réconciliation permettant le retour et la réintégration des ex combattants du MFDC dans 
leurs villages d'origine. 
Article 4 : DE LA RELANCE DES ACTIVITES ECONOMIQUES ET SOCIALES 
 1. L’Etat engage l'ANRAC à mobiliser les ONG et les organismes spécialisés dans la 
dépollution en partenariat avec l'armée et les ex combattants du MFDC à débuter sans 
délais le déminage humanitaire de la Casamance afin de faciliter la reprise des activités 
économiques. 
 2. L’Etat s'engage à prendre toute mesure permettant de faciliter le retour dans leur foyer 
des réfugiés et personnes déplacées et d'apporter l'appui nécessaire à leur réinsertion 
sociale. 
 3. L’Etat s'engage à assurer la reconstruction de la Casamance comme prévu dans le 
Protocole portant programme de reconstruction de la Casamance annexé au présent 
accord. 
 Article 5 : DES DISPOSITIONS FINALES 
 Le présent accord entre en vigueur à la date de sa signature. En foi de quoi, les Parties 
ont signé le présent accord en deux originaux. 
Fait à Dakar, le trente décembre deux mille quatre       
 Pour le Mouvement des Forces               Pour la République du Sénégal 
Démocratiques de la Casamance               S.E.M. Ousmane NGOM 
Abbé Augustin Diamacoune SENGHOR       Ministre de l'Intérieur  
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APPENDIX E: MFDC SECRETARY GENERAL REQUESTS TO 
SENEGALESE PRESIDENT MONEY AND A PLANE TO 
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APPENDIX F: MFDC CIVILIAN LEADERSHIP (BOTH FACTIONS) 
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APPENDIX H: THE COVER OF THE MFDC NEWSPAPER,  "LA 
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